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ABSTRACT 
This report presents research conducted as part of a two-year 
European project (Project Marc) which aims to develop a mechanism to 
assess the risk of theft of electronic products and to take steps to 
make that mechanism operational. The view of the authors, reflected 
throughout this report, is that the task of developing such a tool is 
vital yet daunting. It is vital because of the need to build upon the 
gains made within other sectors and the need to seize the opportunity 
presented by the realisation that crime trends can be explained in 
terms of the supply of opportunities, that reducing the supply of 
opportunities will reduce crime and that these tasks are not the sole 
responsibility of the police. It is daunting because in spite of extensive 
evidence for the efficacy of well-designed and implemented 
opportunity reduction measures, the problem comes when the crime 
to be prevented (theft of electronic products) is widespread but not 
generally devastating to its victims and when opportunity reduction 
finds itself in tension with commercial interests.  
 
The report sets out the process of developing a crime risk assessment 
mechanism and the justification for pursuing the options taken. Initial 
consultation with a variety of stakeholders yielded the common view 
that the crime risk assessment mechanism presented must a) measure 
both risk and protection (ensuring that the two are commensurate), b) 
reflect the perspectives of those who would be tasked with 
implementing it and c) reflect the language of stakeholders from a 
variety of European states. Taking these views on board, the authors 
conducted an extensive consultation with stakeholders from four 
sectors (insurance, consumers’ organisations, law enforcement and 
manufacturers of electronic products) from ten European member 
states. Participants were asked to rate a variety of electronic products 
in terms of both vulnerability and security and to explain the ratings 
they gave. Their responses were used to develop two checklists which 
incorporate a variety of factors, weighted according to the frequency 
with which they were expressed.  
 
The authors suggest that the crime vulnerability checklist developed 
within this report is judged fit for purpose as a provisional 
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measurement. The security measurement by checklist was concluded 
to be inappropriate, since it would lead to limited and unimaginative 
security, and a case-by-case assessment by domain experts is 
advocated, in the light of measured vulnerability. A two-pronged 
approach to rating of electronic products (and possibly services) is 
outlined based upon approaches already deployed in relation to food 
standards   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Risk and Responsibility 
 
This report presents research conducted between 2004 and 2006 
seeking to develop a mechanism to measure the risk of theft of 
electronic products and to take steps towards operationalising that 
mechanism. The last two decades have seen a major change in the 
perception of how crime reduction is to be achieved. Following the 
advance of situational crime prevention and the demonstration that 
crime trends are more readily explained by the supply of opportunities 
than the distribution of criminal propensity across the population 
(Mayhew et al, 1976; Felson, 1998; Felson and Clarke, 1998), crime (in 
particular theft) is widely accepted as a “risk to be calculated…rather 
than a moral aberration which needs to be explained” (Garland, 1996 
p. 450-451).  
 
The second facet of this change in perception is the recognition, first 
expressed in the Morgan Report of 1991 (Home Office, 1991) and 
culminating in England and Wales in the Crime and Disorder Act 
(1998), that the supply of opportunities is under the control of 
agencies other than the police and that the historic reliance upon 
police as the primary crime reduction functionaries was both 
misguided and unfair. Although these advances have resulted in 
dramatic changes in both perception and policy, the picture remains 
incomplete. An example is taken from the experience of England and 
Wales, where there has arguably been more work demonstrating the 
crime-reductive effects of limiting opportunity than elsewhere in 
Europe, and therefore the countries where the evidence base is best 
placed to influence crime control policy.  
 
The Crime and Disorder Act (1998), described by Laycock (2001) as 
“one of the most significant pieces of legislation in support of crime 
reduction” (p.21), brought about the widespread introduction of multi-
agency partnerships tasked with the reduction and prevention of crime 
and disorder and the recognition in Section 17 of that Act that relevant 
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authorities1 must consider the crime and disorder implications of every 
decision that they make. Yet, despite a recommendation by the 
Government’s own Foresight committee on crime, there remains a 
failure to extend the provisions of Section 17 of the Crime and 
Disorder Act to central government and the private sector (the latter 
being crucial to this project). In reality this means that whilst legal 
action2 can be used as an incentive to convince local authority 
planning departments that (for example) housing in the area should be 
built to Secured by Design standards, which render them less 
vulnerable to victimisation (Armitage, 2005)3, those who design, 
manufacture and retail desirable and expensive electronic goods have 
no legal responsibility for the crime and disorder implications of their 
products. Considerations of corporate social responsibility are not 
generally brought to bear on the problem. Whilst legislation alone may 
not always be the answer, the omission of central government and the 
private sector from the provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 
portrays the message that currently these sectors are not charged as 
major suppliers of criminal opportunities. 
 
To restate, the emphasis here is on England and Wales, both because 
much of the research base for situational crime prevention is British, 
and because the writers know of no legislation equivalent to S17 of the 
Crime and Disorder Act, which at least demonstrates the emergent 
mode of thought from which Project MARC sprang.  
 
1.2 Justification for Measuring Risk? 
 
The case for crime reduction is self-evident.  But what justification is 
there for addressing the management of crime by developing a risk 
                                                 
1 Local Authorities, Joint Authorities, National Park Authority, Broads Authority and 
the Police were defined as relevant authorities in the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. 
The Police Reform Act (2002) stated that relevant authorities would extend to 
Primary Care Trusts (April 2004), Fire Authorities (April 2003) and Police Authorities 
(April 2003).  
2 In the form of liability in private law for breach of a statutory duty, or liability to 
judicial review under the doctrine of ultra vires. 
3 As well as countless other examples involving agencies deemed ‘relevant’ to the 
reduction of crime. 
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assessment mechanism to measure the risk of theft of electronic 
goods to complement the more traditional approach of offender 
detection and conviction?  Why should electronic goods be singled out 
for special attention, and what effect is this likely to have on crime 
rates across Europe? The major premise of the advance in situational 
crime prevention and the new opportunity theories (discussed in more 
detail below) is that many individuals, when faced with the chance to 
make a gain (through criminal behaviour), give in to temptation and 
select the option which provides the greatest reward for the lowest 
risk. If crime, as Garland suggests, is a risk to be avoided, the primary 
task facing crime reduction practitioners should be identifying those 
risks and putting interventions in place to reduce them. As is 
highlighted below, the demonstration that modifying criminogenic 
products can be highly effective, as well as the success of risk 
assessment tools in other areas of criminology (built environment, 
young people, vehicles) sufficiently justifies the objectives of this task. 
As pre-eminently desirable and stealable, small electronic products 
provide an obvious starting point for risk assessment.  
 
1.3 Crime: Risk versus Moral Aberration 
 
While notions of crime have a moral position at their core, being those 
behaviours which the state has a direct interest in controlling, 
prudence dictates that crime control proceeds by means other than 
moral condemnation, to complement actions of the criminal justice 
apparatus. There is an abundance of theories as to why individuals 
offend. There are correspondingly many intervention points for the 
reduction of offending - some of which focus upon the offender 
(programmes to reduce drug use), some the victim (crime prevention 
publicity) and others the location in which crimes take place (street 
lighting, CCTV). Early exponents of the suggestion that criminality can 
be explained (at least in part) through biological or developmental 
factors include Cesare Lombroso and his scuola positive in the late 
nineteenth century whose focus lay upon distinguishing the 
characteristics of the born criminal. More recently, biological and 
developmental criminologists have identified factors associated with 
increased risk of criminality. Although these do not focus exclusively 
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upon the biological, factors such as hyperactivity and impulsivity 
(Satterfield and Schell, 1997; Klinteberg et al., 1993), low birth weight 
(McGee et al, 1984; Kolvin et al, 1990) and brain damage (Brennan et 
al, 1991; Michaud et al, 1993) have been identified as risk factors 
associated with criminal and anti-social behaviour.  
 
Authors such as Caspi and Moffit (1995) also emphasise both 
biological and social processes in crime causality, suggesting that 
transient, delinquent behaviour can be linked to social factors such as 
a desire for autonomy and peer delinquency and that the factors 
distinguishing these short-term offenders from long-term, persistent 
offenders lay within neurodevelopmental processes. Moffit’s (2003) 
review of the causes of anti-social behaviour distinguishes between 
two prototypes – life-course-persistent and adolescence-limited. 
According to Moffit (2003), the former has its origins in 
neurodevelopmental processes, begins in childhood, and continues 
into adulthood, the latter has its origins in social processes, begins in 
adolescence and desists in young adulthood. The focus upon genetic 
factors in criminality, and in particular the recent work of Moffit 
(2003), does not focus exclusively upon the biological at the expense 
of situational factors. In fact, the suggestion that life-course-
persistent anti-social behaviour has its origins in early life, but is 
exacerbated by a high-risk social environment (Moffit, 2003), is 
entirely consistent with the need to limit criminogenic opportunities, 
thus minimising the likelihood that those with a propensity to offend 
will be provided with that opportunity. The development of the sub-
discipline of evolutionary psychology is persuasively showing how 
many of the patterns of crime are explicable by the evolutionary 
advantage which errant behaviour conferred on our forebears (see for 
example Walsh and Ellis, 2003).  
 
The view that crime and criminality is abnormal or unusual has 
declined in popularity over the last half of the twentieth and early part 
of the twenty-first century with much evidence-based criminological 
theory focusing upon criminal events as opposed to the offender. 
Although these theories differ in their focus, many share the theme 
that opportunity generates crime and begin from the premise that 
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crime is normal as opposed to something unusual which has to be 
explained. The crucial point is that whatever the origins of crime, 
whatever the distribution of criminal propensity across individuals, 
manipulating the threshold for the translation of inclination into action 
makes sense. Erecting safety barriers around tall structures from which 
suicidal people throw themselves makes sense whatever presumptions 
are made about the causes of suicidal feelings and actions. Such 
barriers simply raise the threshold (both physically and metaphorically) 
which the inclination must exceed for a suicide to occur. Classic 
demonstrations of this come with the reduction of suicide when a 
‘popular’ method of killing oneself ceases to be available (Clarke and 
Lester 1989).     
  
1.4 Opportunity Theories  
 
Although individuals’ propensity to offend varies (and the risk factors 
affecting this are open to debate, see Pease 2005) there is no 
questioning the fact that opportunities influence crime levels and that 
certain people, products and places are more vulnerable than others. 
Several criminological theories (often referred to as the New 
Opportunity Theories) highlight how opportunity generates crime, be 
that opportunity afforded by the physical and social arrangements of 
society or the design (and subsequent demand) of particular targets. In 
Section 1.6 below, a brief overview of crime reduction successes 
achieved on the basis of this perspective will be provided.  
 
Routine Activity Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) considers how the 
structure of modern society and the routine activities of everyday life 
have created more opportunities for criminal activities. Two factors 
acting together were shown to explain the rise in burglary in the 
United States in the 1960s and 1970s. The first was a substantial 
movement of women into the labour force, which meant that homes 
were left without “capable guardians” for much of the day. The second, 
crucial for understanding the origins of Project Marc, was the large 
increase in the ownership of small, expensive consumer products, 
which provided many “suitable targets” for burglary. Cohen and Felson 
(1979) used the acronym VIVA (Value, Inertia, Volume and Access) to 
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describe these suitable targets. Clarke (1999) expands upon this using 
the acronym CRAVED (Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, 
Enjoyable and Disposable) to identify hot products. For example, a 
laptop computer would be concealable and removable, it would be 
widely available, valuable, enjoyable for personal use and disposable 
should the offender choose to sell the product. On the other hand, a 
freezer would be available (with most households containing one), 
reasonably valuable, but would be very difficult to remove, conceal or 
dispose of without drawing too much attention to yourself. According 
to these theories, a laptop would make a much more suitable target 
than a freezer, thus the increase in the use and availability of small, 
valuable products such as mobile phones, iPods, game boys, 
camcorders and hand-held computers have fuelled the opportunities 
for crimes to be committed.  
 
Rational Choice Theory (Cornish and Clarke, 1986) is influenced by 
economic thinking and assumes that offenders seek to maximise the 
benefits of offending and in doing so make rational or quasi-rational 
choices or decisions based upon the information or cues available to 
them at the time of offending. Decision processes are likely to vary 
according to the different stages of criminal involvement, between 
offenders (based upon age, experience etc.) and between different 
offence categories. Preventive suggestions seek to influence an 
offender’s decision or choice to commit a crime through 1) increasing 
what they perceive to be the risks involved in committing that offence 
(installing a burglar alarm, designing housing estates to maximise 
natural surveillance), as well as 2) reducing the rewards should that 
crime occur (property marking). The aim is to ensure that for the 
offender the perceived costs outweigh the perceived benefits of 
offending.  
 
Pattern Theory adds spatial and temporal elements to opportunity 
theories. It suggests that crimes “do not occur randomly in time or 
space or society” (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993 p.264). For 
example, as Brantingham and Brantingham (1993) suggest, bar fights 
are more likely to occur in Friday nights than Tuesday afternoons, 
income tax evasions are likely to cluster around the dates in which 
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payments are due and pilfering of office supplies is likely to cluster 
geographically around areas with a high density of offices. Pattern 
Theory suggests that crimes will cluster around nodes (the places 
where people travel to and from), along pathways (the paths along 
which people travel to get to different nodes) and at the boundaries to 
both nodes and pathways (edges). If offenders are viewed as being the 
same as ‘normal’ citizens (other than their readiness to commit crime), 
the way in which they select a target against which to commit a crime 
is much the same as the method we use to select a service station in 
which to fill our car with petrol. We a) pass the petrol station just as we 
realise we need some petrol or b) have passed the petrol station on a 
previous occasion and know that it offers good value for money, 
therefore making a particular journey back to that area as and when 
we need petrol. If the same applies to offending patterns, offenders 
will select their target because a) they pass it on their way to 
school/work, to visit a friend or attend a leisure facility (it is in their 
activity/awareness space) and realise it has poor security, looks 
unoccupied or has valuable goods on show (or all of the above), 
therefore selecting to offend against the target there and then or b) 
they have passed/noticed the target on a previous occasion and 
decided to offend against the target at a later date. One of the key 
principles of this theory is that offenders, like everybody else, spend 
much of their time travelling between the places where they live and 
the places they attend as part of their leisure/school/work activities 
and they choose their targets from within their activity and awareness 
space.  
 
 “Since burglars are, in a time-budget sense, primarily  
non-burglars, their activity spaces, or places they usually  
spend time, are most likely similar to the activity spaces of  
non-burglars from similar backgrounds and living in  
similar areas” (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984 p.80). 
 
Several research studies support the theory that crimes are likely to 
cluster around offenders’ activity and awareness spaces. These include 
Greenberg and Rohe (1984), Taylor and Gottfredson (1987), Rengert 
and Wasilchick (2000) and Wiles and Costello (2000). 
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All theories outlined above converge in contending that addressing the 
circumstances of crime rather than the psyche of the offender will gain 
crime reduction advantage. The only fundamental opposition to this 
perspective comes from the view that there is a constant amount of 
criminal inclination in the population which, if thwarted by the removal 
of opportunities, seeks out new opportunities to replace them. This 
phenomenon is known as displacement. An extensive literature review 
makes it clear that displacement does occur, but seldom if ever to an 
extent which makes opportunity reduction unproductive. Indeed, 
sometimes the removal of opportunities in one area has a wider crime 
reductive effect. This is known as ‘diffusion of benefits’ (see for 
example Clarke and Weisburd 1994).     
 
Restriction of crime opportunities is, in the writers’ view, a moral 
imperative. It saves from criminal labelling those on the margins of 
crime, arguably especially those whose potential criminal involvement 
is transient and limited to the adolescent years. One element in such 
restriction involves the design of goods and services. It is the most 
difficult to implement, since crime reduction is not a powerful 
component of market forces. Indeed, insofar as stolen goods are 
replaced, and insofar as those who steal things (and those to whom 
they sell them) would not buy them legitimately, there is a perverse 
incentive to produce crime-prone goods. 
 
1.5 Risk Assessment and Crime Reduction: 
 
Risk assessment in criminology is not new. As Wiles et al (2003) 
highlight: “There are at least four criminal justice contexts in which 
understanding and communicating risk is important” (p.1). These four 
areas in which risk-assessment within criminology has traditionally 
focused are: the chance of someone embarking on a criminal career; 
the probability of crime victimisation by location and person; the risk 
of re-offending and finally, the likelihood of a particular offender 
being responsible for a particular unsolved crime (offender profiling). 
To this, the authors would add the risk of victimisation by product – 
the risk of victimisation by vehicle make and model being relatively 
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well established whilst the vulnerability of alternative products is still 
in its infancy (hence the commission of the project reported on here).  
 
The first of these contexts has been the focus of developmental or 
risk-focused criminology for at least three decades (West and 
Farrington, 1973; West, 1982; Farrington, 1978, 1986a, 1986b, 1991, 
1992, 1995) but has risen in prominence (particularly in the United 
Kingdom) since the requirement upon Local Authorities to produce a 
local preventive strategy for children and young people by April 2003. 
Publications such as Homel et al (1999), Youth Justice Board (2001) 
and Wong (2003) highlight the risk and protective factors which 
increase or reduce the likelihood that young people will become 
involved in crime and anti-social behaviour – these are generally 
summarised into the categories: family, school, community/cultural, 
life events and personal/individual.  
 
The risk of victimisation by location is another field in which crime risk 
assessment mechanisms have been successfully applied to reduce the 
vulnerability of the built environment. Coleman (1986) developed a 
Design Disadvantage Score of 0-15 which identifies the threshold 
point at which certain environmental factors (i.e. access points, 
number of dwellings in a block, number of play areas) become 
associated with crime and disorder. Winchester and Jackson (1982) 
also produced an index of risk based upon 14 different variables of 
access and surveillance which were found to be particularly effective in 
discriminating between houses which had been victimised and those 
which had not. The more factors a dwelling possesses, the higher the 
chance of burglary victimisation. Groff and La Vigne (2001) also 
developed a predictive tool to help identify which properties are more 
vulnerable to burglary. The ‘Opportunity Score’ is based upon the 
presence or absence of 10 variables such as street lighting, proximity 
of property to residence of offenders, proximity to major thoroughfare 
and housing tenure. Finally, Armitage (2005) has recently developed a 
risk assessment mechanism – the Burgess Checklist, which is designed 
for practitioners as a means of identifying which properties will 
become vulnerable to crime if built (therefore allowing them to 
challenge planning applications) or, in the case of properties already 
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developed, allowing resources to be directed towards properties at 
most risk. The checklist is based upon the Burgess points system 
described in Simon (1971) who refers to it as “one of the simplest 
prediction methods” (p.31), with an application in a criminological 
context described in Nuttall et al (1977) who commend it as robust 
and simple. Essentially, a score is derived from the difference between 
the mean rate of crime suffered generally, and the rate of crime 
suffered by properties with a particular characteristic (i.e. being 
located next to a footpath, being located on a through road, being 
located next to open land). The method of producing the checklist 
involved collecting evidence regarding 33 environmental factors for 
each of 1058 properties. Each of the 33 factors were then cross 
tabulated against prior victimisation to reveal which factors were most 
associated with crime prone homes. Environmental factors which were 
not associated with risk of burglary (or total crime) at a statistically 
significant level were excluded from the analysis. For those factors 
which were associated with crime risk, the Burgess method was 
applied to calculate a score for presence of that factor. For example, if 
the rate of victimisation of properties in the sample was 10%, the rate 
for properties next to open land was 15% and for properties not 
located next to open land was 5%, then the ‘open land’ factor would be 
scored as +5 for those located next to open land and -5 for those not 
located next to open land. Properties with the highest scores would be 
most vulnerable to victimisation. These are just a small sample of 
examples of the risk assessment tools which have already been 
developed for assessing risk of victimisation within the built 
environment.        
 
The automotive industry (particularly the UK Motor Insurance Repair 
Research Centre) has also developed a comprehensive risk assessment 
mechanism (New Vehicle Security Rating) which is used by the 
insurance industry (who founded the Research Centre) to inform the 
accurate calculation of insurance premiums. Ratings can also be 
accessed by consumers to predict the risk of theft from and theft of 
any vehicle (see http://www.thatcham.org/nvsr/cars/index.html). The 
5 star rating is calculated following attack tests on the vehicle as well 
as laboratory tests on the security system’s components.  
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1.6 The Design of Products and Services and Crime  
 
As was highlighted above, a wide variety of manufactured products 
(those which are CRAVED) promote many different kinds of crime from 
theft and fraud to robbery, violence and vandalism. In general, 
products can serve as tools for crime or as targets for crime. Guns and 
spray-paint cans are tools (for violence and vandalism, respectively) 
while cash, cars and jewellery are popular targets of theft. The advent 
of new products, such as laptop computers, mobile phones and MP3 
players can produce mini crime waves, or crime harvests.  Increasingly, 
crime is not solely focused upon the electronic products themselves 
but also the systems or services associated with those products. For 
example, a criminal who clones a mobile phone/mobile phone SIM 
card is stealing the service, i.e. the provision of phone calls as 
opposed to the product itself. Similarly, electronic products such as 
MP3 players are not only targets of theft, but the services associated 
with these products, such as the ability to download music through the 
internet, have also become targets for criminal activity. 
 
Historically, those who design and manufacture products have largely 
ignored the crime and disorder implications of what they are 
producing. As Pease (1997) suggests, innovations go through three 
phases – First, design without consideration for the crime 
consequences; second, reaping the crime harvest, whereby criminals 
recognise and exploit vulnerabilities, and finally retro-fitting a solution 
(which is usually only partial). Modern examples of this include mobile 
phones, the internet or the design of certain types of housing. This 
weakness, however, is not exclusive to modern technology. As Pease 
(1997) highlights, the Penny Black postage stamp was introduced in 
1840, but withdrawn a year later because people were exploiting the 
fact that the water-soluble red ink with which it was franked could 
simply be washed off, allowing the stamp to be re-used. The Penny 
Black had to be replaced with a Penny Red which was franked with a 
black ink which could not be removed. A more desirable sequence of 
events would be that the crime consequences are considered at the 
design stage, with a regular flow of information between those 
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concerned with crime reduction and those involved with the product’s 
design and manufacture. Ekblom (1997) highlights how designers 
need to be encouraged to shift their perspective from solely user to 
user and misuser and highlights how for this to occur, crime reduction 
information must become more accessible for designers.  
 
“Much remains to be properly evaluated, and the  
working knowledge of prevention that exists is couched  
in a tangle of inconsistent and loosely defined terms  
and concepts which render it difficult for designers to  
access, to think about and to apply” (Ekblom, 1997 p.249).  
 
The historical lack of communication between those whose task it is to 
reduce crime and those whose task it is to design products has led to 
the development of products, buildings, systems and even urban 
spaces which are conducive to the commission of crime and disorder. 
In these instances, the prime objective has to be reactive i.e. 
minimising the impact of the crime harvest rather than a more 
proactive approach. Unfortunately, these bolt-on solutions are often 
significantly more expensive and as the crime event has already 
occurred, the victim is left both traumatised by their experience and 
more vulnerable to future crime and disorder. 
 
1.7 Crime Reduction Success Achieved through Opportunity Reduction 
 
If, as these theories suggest, criminals commit crimes where 
opportunities exist (with low levels of risk and high levels of rewards), 
it follows that crime can be reduced through altering the target (be 
that a product, service, place or person) to increase the risk and effort 
and reduce the potential rewards. This is the central premise of crime 
reduction techniques such as situational crime prevention (SCP) and 
crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) which aim to 
alter the environment in as systematic and permanent way as possible, 
so as to increase the effort and risks of committing a crime and reduce 
the rewards and excuses. These interventions work on the premise 
that offenders make calculated decisions (of limited rationality in 
formal decision theory terms) about the most suitable targets to 
 23
select. Therefore, altering the target (installing a burglar alarm or 
CCTV), or portraying the message that you may have altered the target 
(installing a dummy burglar alarm or installing CCTV in some shops 
but not others) should render that target less suitable, as perceived by 
the potential offender. 
 
As Clarke and Newman (2005) highlight, more than one hundred case 
studies have been published showing that significant declines in 
specific kinds of crimes have been achieved through the introduction 
of situational crime reduction measures (Clarke, 1997; Sherman et al., 
1997; Smith et al., 2002). These include the reduction of car crime 
through the introduction of steering column locks (Webb, 1997) and 
the reduction burglary through increasing physical security (Brown and 
Altman, 1983; Cromwell et al, 1991), minimising access (Brantingham 
and Brantingham, 1975, 1993, 2000; Brantingham et al, 1977; Brown 
and Altman, 1983; Newlands, 1983; Greenberg and Rohe, 1984; 
Cromwell et al, 1991; Bevis and Nutter, 1997; Mirlees-Black et al, 
1998) and increasing surveillance (Reppetto, 1974; Brown and Altman, 
1983; Cromwell et al., 1991; Brown and Bentley, 1993) and a 
combination of the above (Brown, 1999; Pascoe, 1999; Armitage, 
2000). Other situational measures include the reduction of mobile 
phone fraud (cloning and tumbling) through the introduction of user 
and account verification technologies (Clarke et al., 2001) and the 
reduction of violent crime through the introduction of toughened 
glasses in British pubs (Design Council, 2002). As well as its 
effectiveness in reducing crime, the appeal of this type of intervention 
over long term, resource intensive offender based interventions, lays 
in the practical solutions it offers to those who are tasked with the 
reduction of crime. For practitioners who are asked to meet crime 
reduction targets within short timescales (with very little additional 
resources) many crime reduction theories and interventions, as 
highlighted by Smith (2000), may appear unfeasible.  
 
 “It is easy to see that happy families tend not to produce  
criminals. It is hard to see how public policy can decree  
that family relationships be constructive and positive”  
(Smith, 2000 p.149). 
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In short, the evidence for the efficacy of well-designed and 
implemented opportunity reduction measures is overwhelming, and 
constantly growing. The acknowledgement of this is evident in 
measures against terrorism, for example enhanced airport security. 
The central problem comes when the crime to be prevented is 
widespread and not generally devastating, and when opportunity 
reduction finds itself in tension with commercial interests.    
 
1.8 Progress in other Sectors  
 
Although the task of convincing manufacturers of electronic products 
to think about the crime implications of their designs may appear 
daunting, particularly considering the troublesome trade-offs such as 
aesthetics, convenience and costs (discussed in more detail in Ekblom, 
2005), there are several examples of sectors who have taken steps 
(either spontaneously or in response to government pressure) to 
design out crime from within their products and systems. These 
include the UK Vehicle Licensing System, the banking industry and the 
mobile phone industry.  
 
Recognising the weaknesses within the UK vehicle registration and 
licensing system, the then Department of the Environment (DETR), 
which is now the Department for Transport (DfT), commissioned the 
Jill Dando Institute to review the existing system and make 
recommendations for its improvement. Problems within the existing 
system included database inaccuracy, insecurity within vehicle 
identification systems, inadequate enforcement, lack of a strategic 
overview and crime prevention not being awarded sufficient priority. 
Laycock and Webb (2005) describe the process of developing eleven 
recommendations for modernising the UK vehicle licensing and 
registration system and highlight what steps have been taken to 
implement these recommendations. The eleven recommendations 
made by the JDI report were accepted in principle by the UK 
Government, and an Implementation Group, plus several Sub-Groups, 
were established to take forward the recommendations. Lessons which 
can be learned from this project, and hopefully replicated within the 
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electronics industry, include the value of the continual presentation of 
evidence (delivered in this context through the commissioning of a 
series of follow-up research papers) and the need to present 
imaginative proposals within a realistic policy context (Laycock and 
Webb, 2005).      
 
The banking industry has also gone some way towards recognising 
and addressing some of the weaknesses within its systems. In 1991, 
the Home Office commissioned a study, led by Professor Michael Levi, 
to identify a range of preventive strategies to reduce the level of 
plastic fraud - which in that year stood at £165.6 million. As Levi and 
Handley (1998) highlight, most of these recommendations - which 
included tighter controls over requests to redirect mail; card 
awareness campaigns and allowing customers to select their own 
Personal Identification Numbers, were subsequently implemented by 
the banking industry and relevant partners. A follow-up review (Levi 
and Handley,1998) assesses the extent to which subsequent falls in 
fraud can be attributed to those interventions, concluding that the 
successful reduction in plastic fraud, which had fallen to £97.1 million 
by 1996, can be largely attributed to the preventive measures which 
were implemented following the 1991 report.  
 
To some extent the mobile phone industry has begun to consider the 
crime implications of its products. For example, as highlighted by 
Clarke et al (2001), U.S. cell phone companies virtually eliminated 
“cloning,” which had cost them more than $800 million in 1995, by 
extensive modifications made to their software systems.  There was 
little evidence of displacement as a result of these modifications 
because other forms of cell phone fraud showed only modest rises 
when the cloning epidemic was eliminated. However, despite moves 
such as development of the Central Equipment Identity Register (CEIR) 
which allows all five UK networks to bar a phone which is reported lost 
or stolen (through its unique IMEI number) from use within the UK, 
crime reduction considerations have been highly reactive and limited 
in their effects. For example, the failure to require the compulsory 
registration of pay-as-you-go mobile phones allows criminals to 
communicate with total anonymity and facilitates the activities of 
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organised criminals due to the difficulties faced by law enforcement 
agencies when attempting to track the users of specific phones 
(Briscoe, 2001; NCIS, 2003; Myhill, 2004).  In addition, research 
suggests that even with the steps taken by the mobile phone industry 
to develop the CEIR, offenders are stealing mobile phones to export 
outside the UK, where their IMEI is not barred (Harrington and Mayhew, 
2001; BBC News, 2003; Britain Attacks Mobile Phone Theft, 2003; 
Metropolitan Police, 2003; Tackling Worldwide Trade in Stolen Mobiles, 
2003; Ananova, 2004). In addition, offenders are continuing to steal 
and re-programme (change the IMEI)) of mobile phones for re-sale 
within the UK.   
  
1.9 The Measurement of Crime Risk: Electronic Products 
 
Previous paragraphs have demonstrated the good chance of success 
which intervening to measure and reduce the risk of theft of electronic 
products should have. Based upon the widely accepted theoretical 
proposition that crime responds to opportunity and can therefore be 
reduced by blocking opportunities, a mechanism to measure the 
factors which make certain products vulnerable to crime is a relevant 
tool to enable the prediction of risk and therefore the targeting of 
resources. The case has been made for measuring risk and intervening 
to reduce that risk, the remainder of this report will focus upon what 
format that measurement might take in respect of electronic products. 
There are two possible audiences: crime control agencies who might 
alert consumers to risks and the precautions that could be taken to 
minimise them. These are not concerned with design modifications. 
This audience will not require precision, and risk measurement 
directed to this audience is unlikely to attract the hostility of 
manufacturers, particularly if low risk products gain recognition as 
such, rather than high risk products attract opprobrium. The second 
audience comprises manufacturers and retailers and here the 
landscape is different. Manufacturers will very reasonably object to 
making costly design modifications on the basis of imperfect risk 
measurement. To anticipate a conclusion of the present report, the 
risk measurement device which was developed under MARC is less fit 
for purpose in relation to this second audience.    
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Work package 12 of Project Marc introduced the draft Crime Risk 
Assessment Mechanism and described the methodology utilised to 
refine it. To avoid repetition, but still ensure that the reader is clear 
how the authors came to this position, below is a brief review of 
progress to date.  
 
1. 10  Developing a Draft Crime Risk Assessment Mechanism  
 
The process of developing a draft Crime Risk Assessment Mechanism 
took as its basis the Secured Goods by Design model presented by 
Clarke and Newman in 2002. The mechanism was based upon two 
quantitative checklists, one which assesses a product’s vulnerability to 
theft in terms of how concealable, available, valuable, enjoyable and 
disposable a product is. The second assesses the product’s security 
features – for example, does it contain technology to negate its 
financial value if stolen, can it be tracked and has it been field-tested 
for theft? Vulnerability to theft is indexed by the relationship between 
scores on the two indices. Products which have high vulnerability/low 
security will be particularly prone to theft; products which have low 
vulnerability/high security will be less likely to be targeted. Provided 
that a product scores highly enough on the security checklist for its 
predicted level of risk, it can be designated and marketed as Secured 
Goods by Design (or awarded a similar label depending on choice of 
accreditation scheme). The two checklists are presented as tables 1 
and 2 below.   
 
Table 1: Checklist for Risk of Theft 
 Items Item Score 
CONCEALABLE Check one 
On person (score 2) 
In bag (score 1) 
 
REMOVABLE Check one 
Can be carried in one hand (scores 2) 
Can be carried with two hands (score 
1)  
 
AVAILABLE Score 1 for each 
Used outside the home 
Commonly left in parked cars 
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Marketed to young males 
Minimal search time for thief to locate 
product 
VALUABLE Score 1 for each 
Costs at least one day’s wages 
Provides access to phone services 
Provides access to the internet 
Provides access to credit 
 
ENJOYABLE Score 1 for each 
Entertaining 
Addictive 
Fashionable 
Luxury item 
Status item 
Aggressive advertising emphasising 
these themes 
 
DISPOSABLE Score 1 for each 
Widely in demand 
Value easily assessed 
Street price less than 50% of one day’s 
wages 
 
TOTAL SCORE  
 
Table 2: Checklist for Product Security 
Security Feature Score 
• Customer education designed into marketing (e.g. security 
instructions included in package) (score 1) 
 
Replacement guarantee to consumer if product stolen. Check one: 
• Within 90 days (score 1) 
• Within 1 year (score 2) 
• Life of product (score 3) 
 
• Customer education to minimize risk of theft of product 
included in retailer training (score 1) 
 
• Valid means of unique identification of product (e.g. source 
tagging) (score 3) 
 
• Valid means of tracking ownership of product through life cycle 
(e.g. chipping) (score 3) 
 
• Technology designed to delay or defeat attempted theft of item 
(e.g. packaging) (score 3) 
 
• Technology to negate the financial value of the item if stolen 
(e.g. PIN) (score 3) 
 
Cost of inclusion of security features has been: 
• 10% or more of production cost (score 2) 
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• Up to 10% of the production cost (score 1) 
• Zero cost (score 0) 
Cost of security feature included in product has been: 
• Absorbed by manufacturer (score 2) 
• Shared with retailer (score 1) 
• Shared with customer (score 0) 
• Passed on to customer (subtract 1) 
 
Product has been field-tested for theft* 
• Yes (score 1) 
• No (score 0) 
 
TOTAL SCORE   
*Field-testing consist of market research into the product’s perceived attractiveness 
to thieves.  
 
Although the authors considered the proposed mechanism to be an 
excellent basis for developing a crime risk assessment tool, the choice 
between three ways of progressing needed to be made before 
proceeding.  
 
1) Should we accept the original mechanism as it was proposed in 
2002 with little or no revision?  
2) Should we accept its principles of risk versus protection, but reject 
the proposed means of assessing these?  
3) Should we reject both the proposed model and its principles and 
adopt a different approach to crime proofing products?  
 
The first stage towards making this decision involved a consultation 
exercise with key stakeholders regarding the principles of the model 
as well as the specific content of each checklist. Using existing fora 
such as the Home Office Designing Out Crime Working Group as well 
as the CEN Crime Proofing Expert Group as a starting point, 
stakeholders were selected using a snowball process. 30 individuals 
were invited to take part in the consultation exercise, of whom 12 
agreed to participate. The 12 individuals who took part were either 
interviewed face-to-face (see interview schedule at appendix 1), or if 
they preferred, the interview schedule was used as a formal template 
for them to complete as an electronic questionnaire.    
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Table 3 below displays the name, organisation and rationale for 
selection for the 12 respondents who took part in the consultation 
process.  
 
Table 3: Respondents 
Name Organisation Rationale for selection 
Dr. Lorraine Gamman Design Against Crime 
Initiative, Central Saint 
Martins College of Art and 
Design 
Expert in Design Against 
Crime 
Caroline Davey and 
Andrew Wootton 
Salford University Work on Design Council 
Design Against Crime 
projects such as “Think 
Thief – A Designer’s Guide 
to Designing out Crime” 
and “Evidence – Design 
Against Crime Case 
Studies” 
Jane Milne Association of British 
Insurers 
Member of Home Office 
Designing out Crime 
Working Group 
Nina Shuttlewood Home Office  Member of Home Office 
Designing out Crime 
Working Group 
Offer Stern-Weiner Home Office – Street 
Crime Action Team 
Snowball (through Nina 
Shuttlewood) 
James Winter BT Redcare Member of CEN Crime 
Proofing Expert Group 
Paul Ekblom Home Office Expert in Design Against 
Crime 
James Brown Selectamark Member of CEN Crime 
Proofing Expert Group 
Tim Pascoe  PRCI Chair of DOCA and Chair 
of CEN Standard on 
designing out crime in 
residential housing (CEN 
TC325 ENV: 14383-3).  
Anon DTI  Member of CEN Crime 
Proofing Expert Group 
Anon  Anon Member of CEN Crime 
Proofing Expert Group 
Anon  Anon  Member of Home Office 
Designing out Crime 
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Working Group 
Ebrima I Chongan Home Office  Snowball (through Nina 
Shuttlewood) 
 
In general, respondents felt that a crime risk assessment mechanism 
for measuring the vulnerability of electronic products to theft was an 
idea worth developing. However, concerns were expressed regarding 
the lack of flexibility of a quantitative mechanism (in a rapidly 
changing field such as consumer electronics), the need to ensure that 
the mechanism could be completed using a prototype (re-designing a 
product post development would be prohibitively expensive for 
manufacturers), the subjectivity of certain questions and the issues of 
increased bureaucracy and workload.  
 
1.11 If we keep the Checklists: 
 
Respondents made key suggestions regarding the content and design 
of the mechanism, should we decide to pursue this option. The 
specific comments made by respondents are presented in red font in 
the final column of tables 4 and 5 below. Proposed changes to the 
vulnerability checklist relate largely to issues of clarity and subjectivity. 
Proposed changes to the security checklist are more specific, with 
many respondents suggesting that this checklist would be very 
difficult to complete without detailed product information.  
 
Table 4: Specific Comments on Checklist One - Assessing Vulnerability 
 Items Item 
Score
Proposed Changes 
CONCEALABLE Check one 
On person (score 2) 
In bag (score 1) 
 1. Visibility to 
offenders. 
 
REMOVABLE Check one 
Can be carried in one hand  
(  scores 2) 
Can be carried with  
two hands (score 1)  
 1. Add something 
which identifies 
whether product 
is wireless/not 
fixed to 
floor/wall. 
 
AVAILABLE Score 1 for each 
- Used outside the home 
 1. “Minimal search 
time for thief to 
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- Commonly left in  
parked cars 
- Marketed to young males 
- Minimal search time for  
thief to locate product 
locate” needs to 
be more specific. 
2. Change 
“marketed to 
young males” to 
“product has a 
games/camera 
function”.  
VALUABLE Score 1 for each 
- Costs at least one  
day’s wages 
- Provides access to  
phone services 
- Provides access to  
the internet 
- Provides access to credit 
 1. “Costs at least 
one day’s wages” 
is too low.  
2. “Costs at least 
one day’s wages” 
needs to be more 
specific i.e. 
>£200 or 
>average daily 
income in 2005. 
3. Add “provides 
access to user’s 
identity”.   
4. Add “product has 
a distinctive 
design or colour” 
or “product can 
easily be 
identified from a 
distance”.  
5. Clarify “access to 
credit”.  
 
ENJOYABLE Score 1 for each 
- Entertaining 
- Addictive 
- Fashionable 
- Luxury item 
- Status item 
- Aggressive advertising 
 emphasising these themes 
 1. What is the 
difference 
between fashion 
and status?  
 
DISPOSABLE Score 1 for each 
- Widely in demand 
- Value easily assessed 
- Street price less than 50% 
 of one day’s wages 
 1. Add something 
which allows you 
to identify 
whether the 
product is usable 
once in the 
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hands of a 
misuser.  
2. Add “product is 
not easily 
attributed to 
owner i.e. mass 
produced/ no 
batch number”. 
3. Need to identify 
demand for 
second hand 
products – 
people don’t 
want some 
products second 
hand.  
TOTAL SCORE   
 
Table 5: Specific Comments on Checklist Two - Assessing Security   
Security Feature Score Proposed Changes 
• Customer education designed into 
marketing (e.g. security instructions 
included in package) (score 1) 
  
Replacement guarantee to consumer if product 
stolen. Check one: 
• Within 90 days (score 1) 
• Within 1 year (score 2) 
• Life of product (score 3) 
 
 1. This should be 
removed as it 
could be 
counter-
productive – a) 
people may be 
complacent if 
they have a 
replacement 
guarantee, b) this 
may encourage 
false claims of 
theft.  
 
• Tracking technology such as RFIDs to make 
recovery of item easier if stolen, particularly 
during journey from manufacturer to 
consumer (score 3) 
  
• Customer education to minimize risk of theft 
of product included in retailer training (score 
1) 
 1. Add something 
on “ease of use of 
security features.”
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2. Do the security 
features rely 
upon user to 
activate?  
 
• Valid means of unique identification of 
product (e.g. source tagging) (score 3) 
 1. Add “product 
listed on 3rd party 
register”.  
2. “You do this 
with/without 
embedding in a 
registration 
system”.  
 
• Valid means of tracking ownership of 
product through life cycle (e.g. chipping) 
(score 3) 
 1. Add “tracking 
location”. 
2. Tagging and 
chipping have 
virtually the same 
outcome so 
manufacturers 
would be unlikely 
to do both.   
 
• Technology designed to delay or defeat 
attempted theft of item (e.g. packaging) 
(score 3) 
  
• Technology to negate the financial value of 
the item if stolen (e.g. PIN) (score 3) 
 1. Add something 
on difficulty of 
over-riding 
security  
 
Cost of inclusion of security features has been: 
• 10% or more of production cost (score 2) 
• Up to 10% of the production cost (score 1) 
• Zero cost (score 0) 
 1. Suggested that 
this information 
would not be 
easily available  
2. Does higher costs 
on security 
always equate to 
a more secure 
product?  
Cost of security feature included in product has 
been: 
• Absorbed by manufacturer (score 2) 
 1. Does it matter 
who absorbs the 
cost? Surely a 
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• Shared with retailer (score 1) 
• Shared with customer (score 0) 
• Passed on to customer (subtract 1) 
cost passed onto 
the customer 
would only affect 
sales as opposed 
to security.  
 
Product has been field-tested for theft* 
• Yes (score 1) 
• No (score 0) 
 1. Field-testing is 
pointless as this 
has to be pre-
development.  
2. If this is designed 
for post-product 
use, should 
products be 
attack-tested 
rather than just 
perceived 
attractiveness? 
 
TOTAL SCORE    
*Field-testing consist of market research into the product’s perceived attractiveness 
to thieves.  
 
1. 12 Do we Want to Keep the Two Checklists? 
 
In addition to content, participants also commented upon the design 
of the mechanism and whether the existing tool was appropriate for 
the task of measuring the risk of theft of electronic products. In 
general, participants took the view that the concept of risk versus 
protection should be pursued, but that the design of the existing 
mechanism was inappropriate for the electronics industry.  Concern 
was raised regarding the lack of flexibility of a quantitative mechanism 
and whether it would adequately reflect the life cycle of electronic 
products from innovation through to saturation or grow and evolve as 
offenders’ modus operandi changed. Alternative options suggested by 
participants included:  
 
1. One checklist which includes a set of security standards which 
all electronic products must comply with; 
 36
2. Similarly, adopting a proven crime reduction intervention (such 
as Chipping of Goods) and requiring that all electronic products 
above a certain value adopt this approach; 
  
3. Qualitative guidance (similar to that issued to developers and 
police for crime reduction within the built environment) which 
manufacturers can use in developing products; 
 
4. An Advisory Panel of experts who adopt an iterative process of 
not only designing out crime within products and systems, but 
also ensuring that the product/system is user-friendly. This 
process bears similarities to the problem-oriented approach 
(discussed below) and would involve research, conception, 
development and evaluation (iteration one), followed by a 
proposed intervention, followed by iteration 2, followed by a 
proposed intervention, followed by iteration three (and so on). 
This process has been tested at Central Saint Martins College of 
Art and Design on two projects – Stop Thief and Karrysafe; 
 
5. A problem oriented approach based on Ekblom’s 5Is model 
which, rather than awarding a quantitative score, guides key 
agencies through the process of identifying and targeting a 
crime problem. Ekblom (2005) applied the 5Is model to the 
design process and highlights the steps which would need to be 
taken: 
 
• Intelligence – The collection and analysis of information on 
the crime problem and its perpetrators, causes and 
consequences. Applying this to the objectives of Marc would 
involve collecting data on which exact products (including 
model and make) are stolen, and the details of offenders’ 
modus operandi. Although the collection of intelligence is 
crucial to the success of crime reduction interventions, the 
difficulty of building this into the Marc model is that the 
product/system would have to be on the market (leaving 
interventions to alter the design extremely expensive). 
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• Intervention – Applying generic principles through practical 
methods. In relation to Marc, this includes the measures 
included on the Security checklist. 
• Implementation – Making the intervention happen on the 
ground. 
• Involvement – Mobilising agencies to act as responsible crime 
preventers and implement the intervention. 
• Impact – Evaluating the success of the intervention as a crime 
reduction measure. This stage of the process would be 
crucial to the Marc model and would ensure that the 
interventions remained effective in light of changing MOs and 
product demand.   
 
The final stage of developing the draft mechanism involved presenting 
the proposed model as well as the consultation findings to the Marc 
Crime Proofing Steering Group (which included both internal Marc 
partners as well as external partners) who were asked to comment on 
the original model and to make a decision regarding the options for 
progressing.  Before making any decisions, Steering Group members 
were asked to apply the draft mechanism to two electronic products – 
the Apple iPod (20GB) and a FujiFilm Finepix A607 digital camera. 
Participants were given the product and their accompanying 
instructions booklets as well as additional information on the cost, 
weight and retailer from which the product was purchased. 
Participants were asked to complete the draft mechanism on their own 
and record their scores (presented below). The exercise was designed 
to test ease of use as well as inter-rater reliability.  
 
Table 6: Participants’ Scores for Apple iPod 
Vulnerability (min 0, max 21) Security (min 0, max 25) 
14 0 
16  0 
18 0 
16 3 
17 0 
11 0 
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16 0 
17 3 
 
Table 7: Participants’ Scores for FujiFilm Digital Camera 
Vulnerability (min 0, max 21) Security (min 0, max 25) 
14 1 
8 0 
18 0 
14 0 
19 0 
8 0 
7 0 
14 2 
 
Partners were asked to present the scores which they had awarded to 
each product and to discuss how they arrived at that score. The issues 
raised by partners are summarised below. 
 
• Inter-Rater Reliability - The scores awarded to each product 
differed greatly, with some statement/questions revealing 
contrasting answers amongst participants. For example, 
‘Commonly left in car parks’ produced several different answers 
with participants unable to agree what constituted common and 
to whom. 
• Whose Role are we assuming? - Participants were assuming 
different roles whilst answering the questions (these included 
user, misuser and manufacturer), and depending upon the role 
assumed, questions were resulting in very different answers. 
One example of this included the category ‘Concealable’. Some 
participants interpreted this as concealable by the thief once the 
product had been stolen, others interpreted it as relating to how 
concealed the product was by the legitimate user 
• Lack of Clarity - Participants felt that certain 
statements/questions remained unclear. Two examples of this 
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include: ‘Minimal search time for thief to locate product’ and 
‘costs at least one day’s wages’.  
• Subjectivity - Participants felt that the certain categories, in 
particular ‘enjoyable’ were subjective and open to 
misinterpretation.  
• Products as Part of a System - Participants expressed concerns 
regarding the category ‘Removable’ and highlighted that many 
electronic products are part of a system. For example, the iPod 
itself may be used outside the home, but the charger, CD-Rom 
and software allowing the product to be used are typically not.  
• Lack of Information - Participants expressed concern regarding 
manufacturers’ willingness to share information on the cost of 
security. There was also concern regarding questions relating to 
the street price of products which participants felt unable to 
answer accurately without further information.  
• Irrelevant Measures - It was felt that the cost of the security 
features built into the product was largely irrelevant and 
although it may affect the product’s sales figures, it would not 
affect the security levels themselves. Similarly, it was felt that 
the cost of security should not be used as an indicator for the 
level or effectiveness of that security. 
• Unintended Consequences - Participants suggested that the 
category ‘Replacement Guarantee’ should be removed due to the 
likelihood that it may encourage complacency as well as 
fraudulent insurance claims. 
 
In general, participants concluded that the exercise was useful for 
revealing a) the variation between participants’ scores b) the 
juxtaposition of high risk and low security scores, particularly for the 
iPod and c) the need to capture both information relating to a 
product’s vulnerability and inherent security. In light of this, a decision 
was made to retain the principles contained within the draft 
mechanism – that risk should be commensurate with protection, but to 
develop a different framework for measurement. The remainder of this 
report focuses upon the production of an alternative method for 
measuring the principles of risk and protection, before presenting 
recommendations for implementation of the mechanism.  
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2. METHODOLOGY - DEVELOPING, REFINING AND TESTING THE CRIME 
RISK ASSESSMENT MECHANISM  
 
To recapitulate, consultations with key stakeholders (based within the 
UK) as well as members of the Marc Crime Proofing Steering Group 
revealed that, in general, participants felt that the final Crime Risk 
Assessment Mechanism must: 
 
1. Reflect the need for risk/vulnerability and protection/security to 
be commensurate; 
 
2. Reflect the language of those whose task it would be to apply 
the mechanism, rather than imposing the language of 
criminologists; 
 
3. Reflect the language of stakeholders from a variety of European 
states; 
 
4. Be developed using a bottom-up approach, rather than 
imposing a mechanism upon key stakeholders.  
 
2.1 Methodological Steps 
 
As a means of achieving the objectives of this work package and the 
task set by members of the Marc Crime Proofing Steering Group, the 
following methodological steps were implemented: 
 
Step 1: Design Questionnaire 
The questionnaire had to reflect the need to collect stakeholders’ 
opinions – in their words, regarding the vulnerability and security of a 
selection of electronic products. As a means of maximising the 
likelihood that participants would take part, the questionnaire included 
a minimal number of open-ended questions, with the main bulk of the 
questionnaire asking closed-ended questions which offered tick-box 
options for responses.  
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Step 2: Selection of and Production of Descriptive Reports for a Set of 
Electronic Products 
The second step involved the collection of data relating to the price, 
dimensions (width, height and depth), weight, colour, specifications, 
links to services and any additional built-in security features for three 
models of the five following portable electronic products: MP3 players, 
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), Digital Cameras, Mobile Telephones 
and Laptop computers.  
   
Step 3: Selection of a Panel of Key Stakeholders 
The next step involved the selection of a panel of key stakeholders 
willing to take part in the project who represented a mix of 
representatives of manufacturers, representatives of consumers, 
representatives from the insurance industry and representatives of law 
enforcement. The selection of stakeholders also had to include a 
balance of original and accession European member states. 
 
Step 4: Dissemination of the Questionnaire 
The fourth step involved disseminating the questionnaire (in electronic 
format) to the stakeholders who agreed to take part. Language barriers 
also had to be addressed. 
 
Step 5: Collection and Analysis of Data 
The final step involved the collection of completed questionnaires and 
the analysis of findings.  
 
Each of the above steps are explained in more detail in the ensuing 
paragraphs. 
 
2.2 Step 1: Design the Questionnaire 
 
A decision was made at the onset of this section of the project, that 
due to the need to consult with stakeholders from a mix of European 
states, and the language constraints of the researchers involved, the 
most appropriate method for collecting information would be through 
questionnaires, distributed electronically and translated into the 
chosen language of participants. Face-to face interviews would have 
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been prohibitively expensive and researchers would have faced 
language difficulties. Alternatively, telephone interviews would have 
been difficult given the language constraints of the researchers and 
respondents involved.   
 
The questionnaire was designed to collect information on both a) 
participants’ views of the risk level of a variety of electronic products 
and b) participants’ views (in their own words) of what makes a 
product vulnerable or secure. These data were collected by providing 
detailed information on a product’s price, dimensions, weight, 
specifications and additional in-built security features, and asking 
them to rate each product as low, medium of high in terms of its 
vulnerability and existing levels of security. Of just as much 
importance as the rating was the participant’s explanation for that 
selection. For this reason, participants were asked to give three 
reasons why they had made each selection. A copy of the 
questionnaire can be found at appendix 2.  
 
2.3 Step 2: Selection of and Production of Descriptive Reports for a Set 
of Electronic Products  
 
The five electronic products – MP3 players, digital cameras, personal 
digital assistants (PDAs), mobile telephones and laptop computers 
were selected by the Marc Crime Proofing Steering Group as the 
portable electronic products most vulnerable to theft. To allow a 
sufficient level of data without placing high demands upon 
participants’ time, three models of each product type were included in 
the questionnaire.  
 
The three models of each of the five product types were selected to 
ensure a balance of popularity, price, specifications and dimensions. 
To ensure a standard and repeatable methodology, products (and the 
information included on each product) were selected (and gathered) 
using the following process: 
 
1. Selecting the three makes/models awarded the highest score on 
the Which Best Buy guide (www.which.net). If the review of a 
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product were to be split into categories, for example, the digital 
camera review included best buys for cameras with less than 
4Mp, 4Mp to 5Mp and 5.1Mp or more, the best buy model was 
selected from each range. 
    
2. Fixing a specific date on which to identify each product’s price 
and specifications; 
  
3. Searching three online stores to find the price of each 
make/model; 
 
4. Selecting the cheapest price from the three stores.  
 
For example, for MP3 players, the Apple iPod 20Gb was selected as the 
best buy Hard Disk MP3 player from Which online. On the 26th May 
2005, the three websites: Dixons, PCWorld and Currys were searched 
to establish the price for which they sold this product. All three sold 
the product for £189.99, therefore, this price was included on the 
stakeholder questionnaire.  
 
2.4 Step 3: Selection of a Panel of Key Stakeholders 
 
To ensure that responses were gathered from stakeholders 
representing an equal mix of original and accession European member 
states, the two research teams (JDI and UCSC) were given a list of 
countries from which to select their participants. JDI was asked to 
select three countries from the following list of original European 
member states: 
1. UK 
2. Ireland 
3. Sweden 
4. Belgium 
5. Portugal 
6. Denmark 
7. Greece 
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And two countries from the following list of accession European 
member states: 
1. Cyprus 
2. Czech Republic 
3. Hungary 
4. Latvia 
5. Malta 
 
Similarly, UCSC was asked to select three countries from the following 
list of original European member states: 
1. Austria 
2. Finland 
3. France 
4. Germany 
5. Italy 
6. Luxembourg 
7. Netherlands 
8. Spain 
 
And two countries from the following list of accession states: 
1. Lithuania 
2. Poland 
3. Slovenia 
4. Slovakia 
5. Estonia 
 
This gave a total number of six original European member states and 
four accession states.  
 
Once countries had been selected, one representative (from each 
country) from the following four sectors was identified and invited to 
take part in the research project: 
1. Law enforcement 
2. Consumers 
3. Manufacturers of electronic products 
4. Insurance 
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The selection of countries from each of these lists, and stakeholders 
from each of the above sectors involved a snowball process generally 
starting with the countries in which the research team was based, i.e. 
Italy and the UK. Countries were selected based upon the number of 
stakeholders from within that country who were willing to take part. 
An example of the steps taken to select stakeholders is outlined 
below4: 
 
1. Using the UK as a starting point, a number of contacts from 
within each of the four sectors (as well as academics) were 
asked to provide details of individuals working within these 
sectors from the UK; 
 
2. Individuals were contacted and asked if they would be willing to 
complete the questionnaire; 
 
3. Individuals were also asked if they would be willing to provide 
names/contact details of their counterparts in the additional 
eleven countries. 
 
4. These contacts from the additional countries were then asked if 
they would be willing to take part, and also asked for details of 
those working within their field from alternative countries; 
 
5. This process continued until the five countries with the most 
participants willing to take part were selected; 
 
At the end of this process 31 (out of a possible 40) contacts agreed to 
complete, and were sent the questionnaire. 22 participants returned 
completed questionnaires within the required deadline.   
 
2.5 Step 4: Dissemination of the Questionnaire 
 
Once participants had been selected, they were contacted by e-mail, 
which explained the background of the project, the role of the 
                                                 
4 This example is based upon the JDI research team’s experience and was replicated for the UCSC 
team starting with Italy.  
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questionnaire as part of the wider project, the task they were being 
asked to complete and the likely deadlines involved. The introductory 
e-mails did not include the questionnaire.  
 
Once the stakeholder had agreed in principle, the e-mail was followed 
by a phone-call (where possible and appropriate) explaining the 
project in more detail and clarifying any uncertainties that they may 
have. This stage of the process was also used to discuss issues such as 
anonymity and the preferred language into which participants would 
require the questionnaire to be translated.  
 
Once a stakeholder had agreed to take part, the questionnaire was 
sent electronically. Approximately one week before the first deadline, 
participants were sent an e-mail (or received a phone call) reminding 
them about the questionnaire and asking them to let the research 
teams know if they were facing any difficulties. If participants asked 
for an extension to the deadline, this was offered. Those participants 
who did not ask for an extension and did not return the questionnaire 
were sent several reminders until the stage where time would not allow 
their inclusion. To this end, it is suggested that every step was taken 
to accommodate as many participants as possible. 
 
2.6 Step 5: Collection and Analysis of Data 
 
Once the final questionnaires had been collated, responses were 
inputted into SPSS for analysis. The analysis detailed in the results 
section below involves the following 20 steps: 
 
• Analysis of the proportion of respondents who awarded a rating 
of low, medium or high for perceived vulnerability of each of the 
15 products; 
 
• Analysis of the proportion of respondents who awarded a rating 
of low, medium or high for perceived security of each of the 15 
products; 
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• Analysis of the correlation between vulnerability and security – 
do products which are perceived to be the most vulnerable have 
the highest levels of security? 
 
• The vulnerability scores awarded to each product by all 
respondents were aggregated to give a total vulnerability score 
for each of the 15 products. A rating of low was awarded 1 
point, medium 2 points and high 3. The points awarded to each 
product by all 22 respondents were totalled to give a score of 
between 22 (22 x 1) and 66 (22 x 3); 
  
• The security scores awarded to each product by all respondents 
were aggregated to give a total security score for each of the 15 
products. A rating of low was awarded 1 point, medium 2 points 
and high 3. The points awarded to each product by all 22 
respondents were totalled to give a score of between 22 (22 x 1) 
and 66 (22 x 3); 
  
• The mean vulnerability score was calculated by totalling the 
vulnerability scores for the 15 products and dividing that total 
by 15; 
 
• The mean security score was calculated by totalling the security 
scores for each of the 15 products and dividing that total by 15; 
 
• Products were ranked by vulnerability and security scores to 
identify the most and least vulnerable and the most and least 
secure; 
 
• The mean vulnerability and security scores were calculated for 
each of the five product types i.e. MP3 player, digital camera, 
laptop, mobile phone and personal digital assistant to assess 
which product types were considered to be the most vulnerable 
and which were perceived to be the most secure; 
 
• Perceptions of vulnerability and security were analysed by sector 
group i.e. law enforcement, insurance, manufacturers, ESO and 
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consumer associations, to establish whether there was any 
variation of assessments; 
 
• In the original questionnaire respondents were asked to rate 
each product’s vulnerability to theft and to give three reasons 
for that rating.  For each of the products which scored above the 
mean value in terms of vulnerability scores, a detailed 
assessment of the qualitative responses was conducted. This 
involved analysing the responses for each product and creating 
common factors from those responses. For example, ‘costly’, 
‘pricey’, ‘expensive’ and ‘costs a lot’ would be clustered under 
the heading ‘expensive’; 
  
• To ensure that the procedure of allocating responses to 
vulnerability factors was valid and repeatable, the authors 
conducted the categorisation process separately before agreeing 
on acceptable vulnerability factors; 
 
• Once categories were agreed, frequencies were allocated to each 
vulnerability factor/category. This process was again conducted 
separately by two of the authors to maximise inter-rater 
reliability; 
 
• Because respondents were asked to give a maximum of three 
reasons for their rating, where respondents gave more than 
three responses, the first three answers only were utilised for 
this section of the analysis. Where participants gave responses 
which did not address the question i.e. it is vulnerable because: 
“The UK has a high rate of mobile phone theft”, these responses 
were again excluded from this section of the analysis; 
  
• This process was repeated for each of the 15 electronic products 
to produce 15 vulnerability tables which included a vulnerability 
factor and the frequency with which that factor was mentioned; 
  
• In the original questionnaire respondents were asked to rate 
each product’s security level and to give three reasons for that 
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rating.  For each of the products which scored above the mean 
value in terms of security scores, a detailed assessment of the 
qualitative responses was conducted. This involved analysing the 
responses for each product and creating common factors from 
those responses. For example, ‘cable lock’, ‘space for a cable 
lock’, ‘ability to lock computer to surface’, would be clustered 
under the heading ‘cable lock’; 
  
• To ensure that the procedure of allocating responses to security 
factors was valid and repeatable, two of the authors conducted 
the categorisation process separately before agreeing upon 
acceptable security factors; 
 
• Once categories were agreed, frequencies were allocated to each 
security factor/category. This process was again conducted 
separately by two of the authors to maximise inter-rater 
reliability; 
 
• As with the vulnerability factors, responses which were 
considered irrelevant were excluded, as were respondents’ 
fourth, fifth etc. reasons for their rating (they were asked to 
provide a maximum of three reasons); 
 
• This process was repeated for each of the 15 products to 
produce 15 security tables; 
 
• The 15 vulnerability tables were aggregated to give one final 
table containing all vulnerability measures and the frequencies 
which those measures had been mentioned for all 15 products. 
A weighting score was then produced by dividing the frequency 
score by the maximum potential frequency with which that 
factor could have been mentioned. For example, if ‘expensive’ 
was mentioned 22 times, this figure was divided by 330 (22 
multiplied by 15) and multiplied by 100; 
 
• The 15 security tables were aggregated to give one final table 
containing all security measures and the frequencies which 
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those measures had been given for all 15 products. A weighting 
score was then produced by dividing the frequency score by the 
maximum potential frequency with which that factor could have 
been mentioned. For example, if ‘password’ was mentioned 17 
times, this figure was divided by 330 (22 multiplied by 15) and 
multiplied by 100. 
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3. RESULTS 
 
3.1 Participants 
 
As was discussed within the methodology, the original aim was to 
interview four participants (one from each of the four sectors – law 
enforcement, insurance, consumers’ associations and manufacturers 
of electronic products) from ten European countries. Although the 
research teams contacted many stakeholders from each of these 
sectors from a variety of European countries, the final responses 
analysed below reflect the views of 21 participants from nine European 
countries. Five of these countries are original and four are accession 
European member states. The extreme difficulty of recruiting 
respondents may itself be indicative of the fact that the notion of 
crime-reductive design of electronic products is not yet something 
which engages the interest and attention of many of those whose 
involvement would be necessary to successful implementation of a 
risk-based assessment of electronic products.   
 
Table 8 below displays the number of participants who took part from 
each country. The results reveal that only the UK and Italy achieved the 
maximum four respondents. Three respondents took part from the 
Czech Republic, two from Hungary, Poland, Lithuania and Sweden and 
one from Spain and the Netherlands.   
 
Table 8: Geographical Spread of Interview Participants  
Country Frequency Percentage 
UK 4 18% 
Italy 4 18% 
Czech Republic 3 14% 
Hungary 2 9% 
Poland 2 9% 
Lithuania 2 9% 
Sweden 2 9% 
Spain 1 5% 
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Netherlands 1 5% 
Total 21 100% 
 
In addition to the four participants from ten countries, the research 
team invited the views of those working for the European 
Standardisation Organisations (ESOs) ETSI, CEN and CENELEC. One 
response was returned from ETSI making the total number of 
respondents 22.  
 
Table 9 below shows that of a possible 10 (one from each of ten 
countries), seven respondents represented the insurance sector, six 
represented the law enforcement sector, six represented consumers’ 
associations, two respondents represented manufacturers of electronic 
products and one respondent represented ESOs.  
 
Table 9: Sector which Participants Represented  
Sector Frequency Percentage 
Insurance 7 32% 
Law Enforcement 6 27% 
Consumers 
Associations 
6 27% 
Manufacturers of 
Electronic Products 
2 9% 
ESOs 1 5% 
Total 22 100% 
 
The questionnaire which participants were asked to complete focused 
upon the two principles, vulnerability and security. For 15 electronic 
products (three models of five products), participants were asked to 
rate the product in terms of its vulnerability and security and then to 
give three qualitative reasons for that rating. The following section 
looks at the ratings awarded to each of the 15 products.  
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3.2 Vulnerability versus Security – 15 Individual Products: 
 
Of the three Mp3 players – the Apple iPod 20 GB, the Apple iPod Mini 
and the iAudio M3, the Apple iPod 20GB was considered the most 
vulnerable to theft. As tables 10, 11 and 12 highlight, 68% of 
respondents considered the Apple iPod 20GB to be highly vulnerable 
to theft, this is compared to 59% of respondents who felt that the 
iAudio M3 was highly vulnerable to theft and 55% respondents who felt 
that the iPod Mini was highly vulnerable to theft.  Of the three 
products, the iAudio M3 was considered the least secure, with 86% of 
respondents perceiving it to have low security compared to 68% of 
respondents who felt that the Apple iPod 20 GB and the Apple iPod 
Mini had low security.  
 
3.3 Mp3 Players 
 
Table 10: Apple iPod 20GB 
 Vulnerability  Security  
Low  0 68% (15) 
Medium 32% (7) 32% (7) 
High 68% (15) 0 
 
Table 11: Apple iPod Mini 
 Vulnerability  Security  
Low  14% (3) 68% (15) 
Medium 32% (7) 32% (7) 
High 55% (12) 0 
 
Table 12: iAudio M3 
 Vulnerability  Security  
Low  9% (2) 86% (19) 
Medium 32% (7) 5% (1) 
High 59% (13) 9% (2) 
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3.4 Personal Digital Assistants 
 
Of the three Personal Digital Assistants, the Palm One Tungsten T5 
was considered to be the most vulnerable with 64% of respondents 
rating its vulnerability to theft as high. This is compared to 59% of 
respondents rating the HP iPAQ rx3715 as having high vulnerability to 
theft and only 27% of respondents rating the Palm One Zire 72 as 
being highly vulnerable to theft.  
 
In terms of security, all three products were considered to have low 
levels of security but the HP iPAQ rx3715 was considered the least 
secure with 91% of respondents rating its security as low.  
 
Table 13: Palm One Zire 72 
 Vulnerability  Security  
Low  41% (9) 86% (19) 
Medium 32% (7) 14% (3) 
High 27% (6) 0 
 
Table 14: Palm One Tungsten T5 
 Vulnerability  Security  
Low  9% (2) 86% (19) 
Medium 23% (5) 9% (2) 
High 64% (14) 0 
 
Table 15: HP iPAQ rx3715 
 Vulnerability  Security  
Low  9% (2) 91% (20) 
Medium 32% (7) 9% (2) 
High 59% (13) 0 
 
3.5 Digital Cameras 
 
The tables below reveal how the FujiFilm Finepix S7000 was 
considered by respondents to be the most vulnerable of the three 
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digital cameras to theft. 86% of respondents rated its vulnerability as 
high compared to 59% for the Olympus Camedia C-5060 and 41% for 
the Olympus Camedia C-770. All three cameras were considered to 
have low security levels, but the Olympus Camedia C-770 was rated as 
having the lowest levels of security. 91% of respondents rated its 
security as low.  
 
Table 16: Olympus Camedia C-770 Ultra 
 Vulnerability  Security  
Low  5% (1) 91% (20) 
Medium 55% (12) 9% (2) 
High 41% (9) 0 
 
Table 17: Olympus Camedia C-5060 
 Vulnerability  Security  
Low  14% (3) 82% (18) 
Medium 23% (5) 14% (3) 
High 59% (13) 5% (1) 
 
Table 18: FujiFilm Finepix S7000 
 Vulnerability  Security  
Low  0 82% (18) 
Medium 14% (3) 14% (3) 
High 86% (19) 5% (1) 
 
3.6 Mobile Phones 
 
Of the three mobile phones included in the study, the Nokia 6230i was 
considered the most vulnerable with 73% of respondents rating its 
vulnerability to theft as high. Both the Nokia 6230i and the Sony 
Ericsson K700i were rated by 64% of the respondents as having low 
levels of security.  
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Table 19: Motorola V600 
 Vulnerability  Security  
Low  9% (2) 32% (7) 
Medium 27% (6) 46% (10) 
High 64% (14) 23% (5) 
Table 20: Nokia 6230i 
 Vulnerability  Security  
Low  5% (1) 64% (14) 
Medium 23% (5) 32% (7) 
High 73% (16) 5% (1) 
 
Table 21: Sony Ericsson K700i 
 Vulnerability  Security  
Low  0 64% (14) 
Medium 36% (8) 32% (7) 
High 64% (14) 5% (1) 
 
3.7 Laptop Computers 
 
Of the three laptop computers included in the study, the Sony Vaio 
VGN B1XP was considered to be the most vulnerable with 64% of 
respondents rating its vulnerability to theft as high. The Apple 
Powerbook 15 inch was considered to be the least secure of the three 
products with 77% of respondents rating its security levels of low.  
 
Table 22: Toshiba Satellite M30X 159  
 Vulnerability  Security  
Low  18% (4) 14% (3) 
Medium 41% (9) 46% (10) 
High 41% (9) 36% (8) 
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Table 23: Apple Powerbook 15 inch 
 Vulnerability  Security  
Low  14% (3) 77% (17) 
Medium 32% (7) 14% (3) 
High 55% (12) 9% (2) 
 
Table 24: Sony Vaio VGN B1XP 
 Vulnerability  Security  
Low  0 36% (8) 
Medium 36% (8) 50% (11) 
High 64% (14) 14% (3) 
 
3.8 Correlation between Vulnerability and Security 
 
When these individual judgements regarding each product’s 
vulnerability and security are correlated, the results suggest that there 
is a significant negative association between security and vulnerability 
(p = 0.016). This suggests that in general, the majority of responses 
suggested that products with high vulnerability also had low security. 
This may reflect a flaw in the approach taken. In principle the two 
scores are meant to be independent. However, if people when 
considering vulnerability have in mind the level of security, a negative 
association would inevitably appear. There is nothing in the content of 
the questions to invite contamination of this kind, but the possibility 
should be borne in mind.   
 
3.9 Aggregate Scores – Vulnerability versus Security  
 
The table below displays the relationship between vulnerability and 
security when all responses are aggregated. For example, for each 
product the score for vulnerability (1 for low, 2 for medium, 3 for high) 
is totalled for all 22 responses. The maximum level of vulnerability 
would therefore be 66 (3x22) and the maximum level of security would 
be 66 (3 x 22). When scores are aggregated, unlike the analysis of 
individual responses, the correlation between vulnerability and security 
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is not statistically significant (p = 0.855) suggesting that there is little 
consensus across individuals’ responses.  
 
Table 25: Aggregate Vulnerability and Security Scores for Each Product 
Product Aggregate 
Vulnerability 
Score 
Aggregate 
Security Score 
Apple iPod 20GB 59 29 
Apple iPod Mini 53 29 
iAudio M3 55 27 
Palm One Zire 72 41 25 
Palm One Tungsten T5 54 23 
HP iPAQ rx3715 55 24 
Olympus Camedia C-770 Ultra 52 24 
Olympus Camedia C-5060 52 27 
FujiFilm Finepix S7000 63 27 
Motorola V600 56 42 
Nokia 6230i 59 31 
Sony Ericsson K700i 58 31 
Toshiba Satellite M30X 159 49 47 
Apple Powerbook 15 inch 53 29 
Sony Vaio VGN B1XP 58 39 
Mean  54.5 30.3 
 
Table 25 displays each of the 15 products’ aggregate vulnerability and 
security scores. The results reveal that the vulnerability scores (high 
being the most vulnerable) awarded to the 15 products are much 
higher than the security scores. The mean vulnerability score for the 
15 products is 54.5. Dividing this score by 22 (the number of 
respondents) suggests that the average vulnerability score awarded to 
electronic products is 2.5, the maximum vulnerability score being 3 
(high). The mean security score for the 15 products is 30.3. Dividing 
this score by 22 (the number of respondents) suggests that the 
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average security score awarded to this sample of products was 1.4 (3 
being the highest security).     
 
Table 26 reveals that the product considered the most vulnerable to 
theft is the FuljiFilm Finepix S7000 digital camera, followed by the 
Apple iPod 20GB MP3 player and the Nokia 6230i mobile phone. The 
products considered to be the least vulnerable to theft included the 
Palm One Zire 72 PDA, The Toshiba Satellite M30X 150 laptop 
computer and the Olympus Camedia C-5060 and C-770 digital 
cameras.  
 
Table 26: Products Ranked by Vulnerability (high scores being 
products perceived to be most vulnerable)  
Product Aggregate 
Vulnerability 
Score 
Aggregate 
Security Score 
FujiFilm Finepix S7000 63 27 
Apple iPod 20GB 59 29 
Nokia 6230i 59 31 
Sony Ericsson K700i 58 31 
Sony Vaio VGN B1XP 58 39 
Motorola V600 56 42 
HP iPAQ rx3715 55 24 
iAudio M3 55 27 
Palm One Tungsten T5 54 23 
Apple iPod Mini 53 29 
Apple Powerbook 15 inch 53 29 
Olympus Camedia C-770 Ultra 52 24 
Olympus Camedia C-5060 52 27 
Toshiba Satellite M30X 159 49 47 
Palm One Zire 72 41 25 
 
Products considered to be the most secure included the Toshiba 
Satellite M30X 159 laptop computer, the Motorola V600 mobile phone 
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and the Sony Vaio VGN B1XP laptop computer. Products considered to 
be the least secure included the Palm One Tungsten T5 PDA, the 
Olympus Camedia C770 and the HP iPAQ rx3715 PDA.  
 
Table 27: Products Ranked by Security (with the highest score 
representing products perceived to be the most secure).  
Product Aggregate 
Vulnerability 
Score 
Aggregate 
Security Score 
Toshiba Satellite M30X 159 49 47 
Motorola V600 56 42 
Sony Vaio VGN B1XP 58 39 
Nokia 6230i 59 31 
Sony Ericsson K700i 58 31 
Apple iPod 20GB 59 29 
Apple Powerbook 15 inch 53 29 
Apple iPod Mini 53 29 
FujiFilm Finepix S7000 63 27 
iAudio M3 55 27 
Olympus Camedia C-5060 52 27 
Palm One Zire 72 41 25 
HP iPAQ rx3715 55 24 
Olympus Camedia C-770 Ultra 52 24 
Palm One Tungsten T5 54 23 
 
Products which scored higher than the mean in terms of perceived 
vulnerability and lower than the mean in terms of perceived security – 
suggesting that thy would be the most vulnerable, were the FujiFilm 
Finepix S7000 digital camera, the Apple iPod 20GB MP3 player, the HP 
iPAQ rx3715 PDA and the iAudio M3 MP3 player.  
 
The only product which scored lower than the mean in terms of 
perceived vulnerability and higher than the mean in terms of perceived 
security was the Toshiba Satellite M30X 159. 
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3.10 Product Type  
 
When the 15 products are aggregated by product type i.e. MP3 player, 
PDA, mobile phone, digital camera and laptop computer, the results 
reveal that there is very little difference between the scores awarded 
for perceived vulnerability. The highest score is 57.7 for mobile 
phones and the lowest score is 50 for PDAs. However, the scores for 
security show greater variability with the most secure product type 
being the laptop computer with a score of 38.3 and the least secure 
product type being the PDA with a perceived security score of 24. This 
supports some of the earlier comments made by stakeholders that all 
mobile consumer electronic products are vulnerable, irrespective of 
variations in specification, price or dimensions and that any 
accreditation scheme should simply require a set of security standards 
for each of these products.  
 
Table 28: Product Type and Perceptions of Vulnerability and Security  
Product Type (N=3) Aggregate 
Vulnerability Score  
(mean)  
Aggregate Security 
Score (mean) 
MP3 Player 55.7 28.3 
PDA  50 24 
Digital Camera 55.7 26 
Mobile Phone 57.7 34.7 
Laptop 54.5 38.3 
 
3.11 Sector Type and Perceptions of Vulnerability and Security 
Table 29 below displays the difference between responses awarded to 
the sample of 15 products by sector of respondent. The results reveal 
that respondents from law enforcement were the most likely sector to 
rate the sample of products as having high vulnerability to theft whilst 
manufacturers of electronic products were less likely to perceive the 
sample of products to be highly vulnerable to theft.  
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Table 29: Sector Type and Perceptions of Vulnerability  
Sector Low  
(% who 
awarded this 
rating)  
Medium 
(% who 
awarded this 
rating) 
High 
(% who 
awarded this 
rating) 
Law Enforcement 11 20 69 
Insurance 7 32 61 
Consumers’ 
Associations 
12 36 52 
Manufacturers of 
Electronic Products 
14 50 36 
European 
Standardisation 
Organisations  
0 33 67 
 
Table 30 reveals that participants from the insurance sector were most 
likely to consider the sample of electronic products as having low 
levels of security. Participants from European Standardisation 
Organisations and Consumer organisations were the most likely to 
consider the sample of products as having high levels of existing 
security.  
 
Table 30: Sector Type and Perceptions of Security 
Sector Low  
(% who 
awarded this 
rating)  
Medium 
(% who 
awarded this 
rating) 
High 
(% who 
awarded this 
rating) 
Law Enforcement 62 34 3 
Insurance 80 15 5 
Consumers’ 
Associations 
62 25 13 
Manufacturers of 
Electronic Products 
71 29 0 
European 
Standardisation 
67 7 27 
 63
Organisations  
 
3.12 Defining Vulnerability – Stakeholders’ Views 
 
As well as ranking the 15 products in terms of their perceived 
vulnerability to theft and their perceived levels of existing security, 
respondents were asked to give three reasons for each of these 
ratings. The rationale behind this methodology was that the final crime 
risk assessment mechanism should be developed using the language 
of the stakeholders whose task it will be to implement it, rather than 
being imposed by criminologists.  
 
The following section of the report attempts to define vulnerability 
using the language of the respondents who were surveyed. Each of the 
products scoring above average in terms of aggregate vulnerability 
(and later security) scores is looked at individually before an attempt is 
made to summarise what makes a product vulnerable to theft.  
 
3.13 FujiFilm Finepix S7000 – Aggregate Vulnerability Score 63 (out of 
a possible 66). 
 
This product was considered by the sample of respondents to be the 
most vulnerable to theft. The reasons give for the rating of high 
vulnerability are listed in the table below.  
 
Table 31: FujiFilm Finepix S7000 - Defining Vulnerability  
Explanation for Rating  Frequency  
Attractive Design 5 
Carried openly 1 
Commonly used 2 
Desirable 1 
Distinctive - can be identified 
from a distance 
1 
Expensive 11 
Fashionable 0 
 64
Good brand name 3 
High quality specifications  4 
Looks expensive  2 
Marketable/Easy to re-sell  3 
No association to a specific 
person 
1 
Popular 4 
Popular amongst young people 0 
Small/Light 4 
  
3.14 Apple iPod 20GB – Aggregate Vulnerability Score 59 (out of a 
possible 66)  
 
The Apple iPod 20GB was considered by the sample of 22 respondents 
to be the second most vulnerable product scoring 59 out of a possible 
66. The table below outlines the reasons given by respondents for the 
high rating for vulnerability.  
 
Table 32: Apple iPod 20GB – Defining Vulnerability 
Explanation for Rating  Frequency  
Attractive Design 4 
Carried openly 1 
Commonly used 0 
Desirable 1 
Distinctive - can be identified 
from a distance 
3 
Expensive 8 
Fashionable 2 
Good brand name 1 
High quality specifications  3 
Looks expensive  0 
Marketable/Easy to re-sell  4 
No association to a specific 0 
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person 
Popular 6 
Popular amongst young people 4 
Small/Light 13 
 
3. 15 Nokia 6230i Mobile – Aggregate Vulnerability Score 59 (out of a 
possible 66) 
 
The Nokia 6230i mobile phone was considered by respondents to be 
the second (joint) most vulnerable product to theft. The reasons given 
for this high rating are identified in the table below.  
 
Table 33: Nokia 6230i – Defining Vulnerability 
Explanation for Rating  Frequency  
Attractive Design 2 
Carried openly 0 
Commonly used 3 
Desirable 2 
Distinctive - can be identified 
from a distance 
0 
Expensive 7 
Fashionable 2 
Good brand name 2 
High quality specifications  3 
Looks expensive  0 
Marketable/Easy to re-sell  2 
No association to a specific 
person 
0 
Popular 4 
Popular amongst young people 2 
Small/Light 9 
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3. 16 Sony Ericsson K700i – Aggregate Vulnerability Score 58 (out of a 
possible 66) 
 
The Sony Ericsson K700i mobile phone was considered to be the 
fourth most vulnerable product by the sample of 22 stakeholders 
scoring 58 out of a possible 66. The reasons given for this high rating 
are outlined in the table below.  
 
Table 34: Sony Ericsson K700i – Defining Vulnerability 
Explanation for Rating  Frequency  
Attractive Design 3 
Carried openly 0 
Commonly used 1 
Desirable 1 
Distinctive - can be identified 
from a distance 
0 
Expensive 7 
Fashionable 2 
Good brand name 0 
High quality specifications  6 
Looks expensive  0 
Marketable/Easy to re-sell  2 
No association to a specific 
person 
0 
Popular 7 
Popular amongst young people 2 
Small/Light 9 
 
3.17 Sony Vaio VGN B1XP – Aggregate Vulnerability Score 58 (out of a 
possible 66)  
 
The Sony Vaio VGN B1XP laptop computer was considered to be the 
fourth (joint) most vulnerable product from the sample, scoring 58 out 
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of a possible 66. The reasons given for its high rating are listed in the 
table below.  
 
Table 35: Sony Vaio VGN B1XP – Defining Vulnerability 
Explanation for Rating  Frequency  
Attractive Design 7 
Carried openly 0 
Commonly used 1 
Desirable 2 
Distinctive - can be identified 
from a distance 
0 
Expensive 9 
Fashionable 0 
Good brand name 4 
High quality specifications  2 
Looks expensive  0 
Marketable/Easy to re-sell  2 
No association to a specific 
person 
0 
Popular 6 
Popular amongst young people 0 
Small/Light 7 
 
3.18 Motorola V600 – Aggregate Vulnerability Score 56 (out of a 
possible 66). 
 
The Motorola V600 mobile phone was considered by the sample of 22 
respondents to be the sixth most vulnerable electronic product, 
scoring 56 out of a possible 66. The reasons given for its high rating 
are detailed in the table below.  
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Table 36: Motorola V600 – Defining Vulnerability 
Explanation for Rating  Frequency  
Attractive Design 7 
Carried openly 0 
Commonly used 2 
Desirable 1 
Distinctive - can be identified 
from a distance 
0 
Expensive 5 
Fashionable 4 
Good brand name 0 
High quality specifications  2 
Looks expensive  0 
Marketable/Easy to re-sell  0 
No association to a specific 
person 
0 
Popular 3 
Popular amongst young people 2 
Small/Light 10 
 
3.19 HP iPAQ rx3715 – Aggregate Vulnerability Score 55 (out of 66). 
 
The HP iPAQ rx3715 personal digital assistant was considered by the 
sample of 22 respondents to be the seventh most vulnerable product, 
scoring 55 out of a possible 66. The reasons given for this high rating 
are detailed in the table below.  
 
Table 37: HP iPAQ rx3715 – Defining Vulnerability 
Explanation for Rating  Frequency  
Attractive Design 3 
Carried openly 0 
Commonly used 1 
Desirable 2 
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Distinctive - can be identified 
from a distance 
1 
Expensive 7 
Fashionable 0 
Good brand name 2 
High quality specifications  6 
Looks expensive  1 
Marketable/Easy to re-sell  1 
No association to a specific 
person 
0 
Popular 5 
Popular amongst young people 0 
Small/Light 11 
 
3.20 iAudio M3 – Aggregate Vulnerability Score 55 (out of 66) 
 
The iAudio M3 Mp3 player was judged by the sample of 22 
respondents to be the seventh (joint) most vulnerable product, scoring 
55 out of a maximum 66. The reasons given for the high rating are 
detailed in the table below.  
 
Table 38: iAudio M3 – Defining Vulnerability 
Explanation for Rating  Frequency  
Attractive Design 2 
Carried openly 0 
Commonly used 0 
Desirable 0 
Distinctive - can be identified 
from a distance 
0 
Expensive 7 
Fashionable 1 
Good brand name 0 
High quality specifications  1 
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Looks expensive  0 
Marketable/Easy to re-sell  2 
No association to a specific 
person 
0 
Popular 3 
Popular amongst young people 1 
Small/Light 13 
 
If all responses are aggregated to create a list of ‘vulnerability 
measures’ against a total frequency, this can be used to create a 
weighting system for measuring the likely risk of theft. Table 38 below 
displays each measure against the frequency of responses, followed by 
the score, which represents the frequency as a proportion of the 
maximum potential score if all participants had given that answer for 
all 15 products. The maximum potential number of responses is 330 - 
22 respondents multiplied by 15 products.  
 
Table 39: Producing a Scoring System for Vulnerability Factors 
Explanation for Rating  Frequency  
(maximum 
potential score 
is 330)5 
Score 
(frequency/330 
x 100) 
Attractive Design 33 10 
Carried openly 2 1 
Commonly used 10 3 
Desirable 10 3 
Distinctive - can be identified 
from a distance 
5 2 
Expensive 61 19 
Fashionable 11 3 
Good brand name 12 4 
High quality specifications  27 8 
                                                 
5 22 (participants) x 15 (products) 
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Looks expensive  3 1 
Marketable/Easy to re-sell  16 5 
No association to a specific 
person 
1 16 
Popular 38 12 
Popular amongst young people 11 3 
Small/Light 76 23 
 
Although this will be explored in the final section, a potential option 
for the final vulnerability scoring system could include providing the 
option of awarding minus scores for inverse measures. For example a 
product which is considered distinctive and can be identified from a 
distance would score 1; a product which is not identifiable from a 
distance would score -1.   
 
3.21 Defining Security – Stakeholders’ Views 
 
As has been discussed throughout this report, a mechanism to 
measure the risk of theft of electronic products must take into account 
both the vulnerability of that product and existing levels of security, 
ensuring that the two are commensurate. As well as being asked to 
rank the 15 products in terms of their levels of security, the 22 
participants were asked to give three reasons why they had awarded 
that score. The following section of this report looks at the measures 
considered by stakeholders to define security. Responses for the five 
products which scored higher than the mean in terms of their 
aggregate security scores are analysed in attempt to create a ‘security’ 
measure.  
 
3.22 Toshiba Satellite M30X 159 – Aggregate Security Score 47 (out of 
a possible 66) 
 
The Toshiba Satellite M30X 159 was considered by the 22 respondents 
to be the most secure of the 15 products (even though it only scored 
                                                 
6 0.3 has been rounded up to give a figure of 1. 
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47 out of 66). The table below outlined the reasons given for this 
relatively high score.  
 
Table 40: Toshiba Satellite M30X 159 – Defining Security 
Explanation for Rating  Frequency  
BIOS password 1 
Cable-lock 6 
Password protection 9 
Phone/card locking 0 
PIN code 0 
Requires installation  1 
Serial number 1 
 
Compared to the extensive reasons given by respondents to describe 
why a product is vulnerable to theft, the definitions of security are 
limited. One reason for this could be that although this product (and 
the four others discussed below), scored highly relative to the rest of 
the sample, the score of 47 out of a possible 66 suggests that it was 
still not considered to be a secure product.  
 
3.23 Motorola V600 – Aggregate Security Score 42 (out of 66) 
 
The Motorola V600 mobile phone was considered by the sample of 22 
stakeholders to be the second most secure product, even though the 
aggregate score for this product was just 42 out of a possible 66.  
 
Table 41: Motorola V600 – Defining Security 
Explanation for Rating  Frequency  
BIOS password 0 
Cable-lock 0 
Password protection 4 
Phone/card locking 4 
PIN code 1 
Requires installation  0 
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Serial number 0 
 
Again, it should be highlighted that respondents do not appear able to 
define security in relation to these products, suggesting that the 
‘Security’ element of the proposed mechanism may have to be 
developed following additional research. 
 
3.24 Sony Vaio VGN B1XP – Aggregate Security Score 39 (out of 66) 
 
The Sony Vaio VGN B1XP was considered by the sample of 22 
stakeholders to be the third most secure product even though its 
aggregate security score was only 39 out of a possible 66.  
 
Table 42: Sony Vaio VGN B1XP – Defining Security 
Explanation for Rating  Frequency  
BIOS password 1 
Cable-lock 0 
Password protection 9 
Phone/card locking 0 
PIN code 0 
Requires installation  1 
Serial number 0 
 
3.25 Nokia 6230i – Aggregate Security Score 31 (out of 66) 
 
The Nokia 6230i mobile phone was considered by the sample of 22 
respondents to be the fourth most secure of the 15 products. Even 
though this product was considered to be the fourth most secure, and 
scoring above the mean in terms of its security, it still only scored 31 
out of a possible 66. Reasons given by the stakeholders for the 
relatively high score are detailed in the table below.  
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Table 43: Nokia 6230i – Defining Security 
Explanation for Rating  Frequency  
BIOS password 0 
Cable-lock 0 
Password protection 1 
Phone/card locking 2 
PIN code 0 
Requires installation  0 
Serial number 0 
 
3.26 Sony Ericsson K700i – Aggregate Security Score 31 (out of 66) 
 
The Sony Ericsson K700i mobile phone was considered to be the (joint) 
fourth most secure product by the sample of 22 respondents. Even 
though this product was considered to be relatively secure, it still only 
scored 31 out of a possible 66. The reasons given by the respondents 
for its relatively high security score are outlined in the table below.  
 
Table 44: Sony Ericsson K700i – Defining Security 
Explanation for Rating  Frequency  
BIOS password 0 
Cable-lock 0 
Password protection 1 
Phone/card locking 2 
PIN code 1 
Requires installation  0 
Serial number 0 
 
Although the original intention was create a final crime risk 
assessment mechanism based upon the responses given by 
stakeholders (meaning that the risk factors would be defined by those 
likely to use the tool and written in their language), very few responses 
were given by stakeholders when they were asked to define security. 
 75
The following table makes some attempt to score the security factors 
given. 
 
 Table 45: Producing a Scoring System for Security Factors 
Explanation for Rating  Frequency  
(maximum 
potential score 
is 330)7 
Score 
(frequency/330 
x 100) 
BIOS password 2 1 
Cable lock 6 2 
Password protection 24 7 
Serial number 1 3 
Requires installation 2 1 
PIN code 2 1 
Phone/card locking 8 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 22 (participants) x 15 (products) 
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4. DEFINTION OF THE FINAL CRIME RISK ASSESSMENT MECHANISM 
 
4.1. ASSESSMENT OF RISK – PROGRESS SO FAR 
As has been detailed throughout this report, the task of developing a 
crime risk assessment mechanism to measure the risk of theft of 
electronic products took as its starting point a model developed by 
Clarke and Newman (2002) entitled Secured Goods by Design. 
Consultation with twelve UK stakeholders as well as the Marc Crime 
Proofing Steering Group addressed the options of whether we should:  
 
a) Retain the Secured Goods by Design model with little or no 
revisions,  
 
b) Accept the principles of that model – that risk should be 
commensurate with protection, but reject the proposed means of 
assessing these, or  
 
c) Reject both the proposed model and its principles and adopt an 
entirely different approach to crime proofing products.  
 
Alternative options raised by participants included:  
 
a) Having just one checklist which contained a set of security 
standards and requiring all electronic products to comply with these 
standards;  
 
b) Adopting a proven crime reduction intervention, such as Chipping 
of Goods, and again requiring all electronic products to implement 
these measures  
 
c) Producing qualitative guidance similar to that used within the field 
of designing out crime within the built environment and developing 
processes (including the Iterative or 5Is processes detailed in section 
1.12) to implement this guidance.  
 
The results of the consultation exercise revealed that, in general 
participants felt that the principles of the original mechanism should 
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be retained, but a different framework for measurement should be 
developed. Participants felt that the final mechanism must:  
 
a) Reflect the need for risk and protection to be proportionate;  
 
b) Reflect the language of those whose task it would be to apply the 
mechanism i.e., manufacturers and designers of electronic goods as 
opposed to criminologists;  
 
c) Reflect the language and the views of stakeholders from a variety of 
European states and d) be developed using a bottom-up approach 
which is transparent to those implementing it at a future date.  
 
Section three presents the findings of the extensive consultation with 
European stakeholders and presents a draft version of the crime risk 
assessment mechanism. It is the authors’ view that the crime risk 
assessment mechanism developed as part of this project will need to 
be sold to two audiences: crime control agencies that might alert 
consumers to risk and provide cautionary advice, and manufacturers 
who would be asked to develop their products based upon the 
findings. The risk mechanism presented within section three remains 
fit for purpose in relation to the first audience, but does not achieve 
the precision necessary for the second. Issues which remain unclear 
and which need to be addressed before the final crime risk assessment 
mechanism can be considered for application include: 
 
a) Whether two checklists can be justified based upon the lack of 
variability in vulnerability scores awarded by respondents;  
 
b) Whether the different responses from original and accession states 
warrant a phased mechanism which differs between countries;  
 
c) How the clarity of the vulnerability checklist may be enhanced, 
addressing the weaknesses within the security checklist;  
 
d) How to engage manufacturers of electronic products (who 
represented just 9% of the sample);  
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e) How to overcome the perverse incentives which allow consumers to 
benefit from the theft of electronic products through an upgraded 
replacement;  
 
f) How to produce a mechanism which is flexible enough to 
accommodate the changes in risk and protection, and  
 
g) How to strike a balance between the risk of miscalculating 
vulnerability and the costs of re-designing products (post 
manufacture) which may prove prohibitively expensive.  
 
The remaining sections of this report will focus upon refining the 
weaknesses in the presentation and implementation of the mechanism 
before presenting a serious of recommendations, and reconsidering 
some of the assumptions on which the approach taken was based. 
 
4.2 NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN MARKET PENETRATION AND EARLY 
WARNINGS ABOUT CRIME RISK. 
 
Although the theoretical propositions discussed throughout this report 
should make it clear how certain products and services (as well as 
places and people) are more vulnerable to crime, and that these 
vulnerabilities can be predicted and prevented based upon calculations 
of risk, it should be borne in mind that both risk and protection do not 
remain static. A product’s vulnerability to crime varies according to its 
position within the product life cycle, as well as offenders’ ability to 
adapt to its inherent security features (Ekblom, 1999; Pease, 2001). 
Clarke and Felson (1998) suggest that thefts of mass produced 
consumer goods are affected by their position with the life cycle from 
innovation – where thefts would remain low due to the small number 
of homes containing (or people owning) these products, through to 
growth and mass market stages – where thefts would increase due to 
the increased demand and availability. Finally, when a product reaches 
the saturation stage, thefts will decline due to the reduction in 
legitimate purchase price as well as the falling levels of demand. This 
theory is supported by Wellsmith and Burrell (2005) who found that 
the property stolen in domestic burglaries changes according to its 
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price and ownership levels. As well as varying over time, a product’s 
vulnerability also varies between countries, a point which was 
highlighted in the analysis of responses from the nine countries 
included in the consultation exercise. This was highlighted, in 
particular, by the two products the Apple iPod MP3 player and the 
Apple Powerbook laptop computer. These two products were rated as 
highly vulnerable by the majority of respondents however, those from 
the accession member states, in particular Lithuania and the Czech 
Republic, rated these products as lower in terms of their vulnerability, 
stating that the products are not popular and that they would be 
difficult to re-sell with low marketability. The final mechanism and the 
system of applying it, must take these differences into account.    
 
At a minimum, the application of the checklist approach as currently 
envisaged is a consciousness-raising exercise. One way of using this 
approach is via the communication of crime risks (both absolute for a 
product type and differentially amongst models within a product type) 
from countries with high penetration of a stealable (CRAVED) product, 
to those countries with low penetration. This would at least forewarn 
of upcoming dangers, and perhaps confer some slight competitive 
advantage on those models shown to be less vulnerable in early-
uptake countries.    
 
4.3 IMPROVING THE VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST 
 
The task which participants undertook made no reference to the 
CRAVED framework. This was deliberate, because to frame the task in 
terms which assumed the validity of the CRAVED framework would be 
to assume what we set out to test. The downside of this is that the 
data do not allow a direct test of CRAVED.  Insofar as Table 39 can be 
interpreted in CRAVED terms, it endorses the relevance of CRAVED 
factors. Many of the comments clearly refer to CRAVED factors. 
Expensive means valuable, small/light reflects concealable, popular 
and desirable (and perhaps fashionable) mean enjoyable, and 
marketable means disposable. However, the meaning of other factors 
cited as contributing to vulnerability have to be interpreted. Does ‘high 
quality specifications’ stand proxy for expensive? Is ‘good brand name’ 
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a marker for expensive, enjoyable, disposable, or none of these? The 
impression which we have is that CRAVED remains a good analytic 
framework. Notwithstanding this, the search for a simpler measure of 
vulnerability should be undertaken simply because simplicity in use is 
valuable. Lacking details of the actual relative vulnerability of the 
products included (which would require an enormous research project 
in its own right) the aggregate judgement of vulnerability made by our 
expert respondents was used as the benchmark for a possible simpler 
measure.      
 
Exploratory analysis was undertaken with the variables of price, 
weight, price per unit weight and aggregate vulnerability score. 
Surprisingly, there was no relationship between price and rated 
vulnerability, and only a modest and statistically unreliable association 
between price per unit weight and vulnerability score. This pattern 
reproduced itself within each product type as well as across products. 
Excluding the most expensive products (laptops) increases the 
relationship between price and vulnerability, but does not render it 
statistically reliable. We must thus conclude that rated vulnerability is 
not reducible to the simpler variables of weight and price. Whether 
rated vulnerability approximates more closely to theft rates than price 
and weight, as noted above, can only be determined by a very 
substantial additional research programme. Assuming the domain 
experts involved as respondents bring knowledge and experience to 
the table, the conclusion is reached that their judgements of 
vulnerability cannot be reduced to simpler measures of weight and 
cost. This has to be a provisional judgement. The small range of 
vulnerability scores noted earlier remains troubling. CRAVED, in the 
writers’ view, remains the best available organising framework for 
vulnerability to theft.    
 
4.4. THE WEAKNESS OF THE SECURITY CHECKLIST 
 
The recommendation to be reached at the end of this report is that the 
security checklist is not a sound basis for evaluating product security. 
The central reason is that the progress of the research, and 
consultations with respondents and others, demonstrated that this 
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approach would impose an artificial ceiling upon the exercise of 
ingenuity and skill in crime-reductive engineering and design. It also 
understates the degree to which security is specific to product type. 
For example, most of the security measures set out as Table 45 are 
specific to individual product types or pairs of product types. Since no 
general or common security features emerge, the justification for 
standardisation disappears. With hindsight, the classic matrix 
developed by Ron Clarke (see below) reflects such a richness of 
alternative methods that the checklist approach seems formulaic by 
contrast. 
 
Table 46: Twenty Five Techniques of Situational Crime Prevention 
 
Increase the Effort Increase the Risks Reduce the 
Rewards 
Reduce 
Provocations 
Remove Excuses 
1. Target harden 
? Steering 
column locks 
and ignition 
immobilisers 
? Anti-robbery 
screens 
? Tamper-proof 
packaging 
6.  Extend 
guardianship 
? Go out in 
group at night 
? Leave signs of 
occupancy 
? Carry cell 
phone 
 
11. Conceal 
targets 
? Off-street 
parking 
? Gender-
neutral phone 
directories 
? Unmarked 
armoured 
trucks 
16. Reduce 
frustrations and 
stress 
? Efficient lines  
? Polite service 
? Expanded 
seating 
? Soothing 
music/muted 
lights 
21. Set rules 
? Rental 
agreements  
? Harassment 
codes 
? Hotel 
registration 
2. Control access 
to facilities 
? Entry phones 
? Electronic card 
access 
7. Assist natural 
surveillance 
? Improved 
street lighting 
? Defensible 
12. Remove 
targets  
? Removable car 
radio 
? Women’s 
17. Avoid disputes 
? Separate 
seating for rival 
soccer fans 
? Reduce 
22. Post 
instructions  
? “No Parking” 
? “Private 
Property” 
3. Screen exits 
• Ticket needed 
for exit  
? Export 
documents 
? Electronic 
merchandise 
tags 
 
8. Reduce 
anonymity 
? Taxi driver IDs 
? “How’s my 
driving?” 
decals 
? School 
uniforms 
13. Identify 
property 
? Property 
marking 
? Vehicle 
licensing and 
parts marking 
? Cattle 
branding 
18. Reduce 
temptation and 
arousal  
? Controls on 
violent 
pornography 
? Enforce good 
behaviour on 
soccer field   
? Prohibit racial 
slurs 
23. Alert 
conscience 
? Roadside 
speed display 
boards 
? Signatures for 
customs 
declarations 
? “Shoplifting is 
stealing”  
4. Deflect 
offenders 
? Street closures 
? Separate 
9. Use place 
managers 
? CCTV for 
double-deck 
14. Disrupt 
markets 
? Monitor pawn 
shops 
19.  Neutralize peer 
pressure 
24. Assist 
compliance  
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bathrooms for 
women   
? Disperse pubs 
buses  
? Two clerks for 
convenience 
stores  
? Reward 
vigilance 
? Controls on 
classified ads. 
? License street 
vendors  
? “Idiots drink 
and drive” 
? “It’s OK to say 
No” 
? Disperse 
troublemakers 
at school 
? Easy library 
checkout 
? Public 
lavatories 
? Litter 
receptacles 
5. Control tools/ 
weapons 
? “Smart” guns  
? Restrict spray 
paint sales to 
juveniles 
? Toughened 
beer glasses 
 
10. Strengthen 
formal 
surveillance 
? Red light 
cameras 
? Burglar alarms 
? Security 
guards 
15. Deny benefits 
? Ink 
merchandise 
tags 
? Graffiti 
cleaning 
? Disabling 
stolen cell 
phones 
 
20. Discourage 
imitation 
? Rapid repair of 
vandalism 
? V-chips in TVs 
? Censor details 
of modus 
operandi 
25. Control drugs 
and alcohol   
? Breathalyzers 
in bars 
? Server 
intervention 
programs 
? Alcohol-free 
events 
 
Sources: Ronald V Clarke and John Eck (2003) Become a Problem Solving Crime Analyst. Cullompton, UK: 
Willan Publishing; Derek B. Cornish and Ronald V. Clarke (2003) “Opportunities, Precipitators and Criminal 
Decisions. In Theory for Practice in Situational Crime Prevention, Crime Prevention Studies, Vol 16. 
Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press. Website: www.popcenter.org   
 
What can be retrieved from the security checklist idea is the notion 
that when invited to make global estimates of security and 
vulnerability, vulnerability was virtually across the board judged 
greater than security. In other words, security is generally perceived to 
fall short of commensurability with vulnerability. 
 
4.5. DO FINDINGS SUGGEST THAT ALL PORTABLE PRODUCTS ARE 
VULNERABLE TO THEFT AND SHOULD BE TREATED AS EQUAL IN TERMS 
OF SECURITY? 
 
Although the consultation process revealed that participants felt that 
the final mechanism must measure risk and protection separately and 
ensure that they are commensurate, the results presented in section 
three again throw some doubt on this decision. The aggregate security 
scores, which presented the score awarded for the perceived security 
(1 being low, 2 being medium and 3 being high) of each of the 15 
products by the 22 respondents, revealed a large mean difference in 
the scores awarded to different products. For example, PDAs were 
considered to be the least secure, with a mean (aggregate score 
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divided by 3) security score of 24. Laptop computers were awarded a 
mean security score of 38. In direct contrast to this, the variation 
between product types for perceived vulnerability varies very little. The 
mean aggregate vulnerability score for PDAs (considered the least 
vulnerable) was 50; however, for mobile phones (the product 
considered to be the most vulnerable) this score was only 57.  
 
To précis, vulnerability within products of the same type varied little. 
Rated security varied much more. Do these findings suggest that all 
portable consumer electronic products of the same type are similarly 
vulnerable to theft irrespective of the level of security incorporated 
(within the range of security levels currently incorporated)? To address 
this point, we need to consider details of criminal method which are 
not routinely gathered. Put informally, there are two questions to be 
addressed: 
 
1. Are the relevant products ‘naked’ at the point of theft? 
2. Are a non-trivial number of the products discarded, or is a theft 
aborted when a thief knows the particular model carried by the 
intended victim?  
 
These questions are linked in that, to the extent that the nature of 
products are not evident at the point of theft, upon being recognised 
for what they are, are they thrown away? For example a wallet stolen 
by an 18-year-old containing photo ID of a woman of 80 is of little 
direct value to the thief and may be discarded. It is believed that all the 
products are typically ‘clothed’ (in handbags, pockets or carrying 
cases) at the point of theft. The possible exception may be MP3 
players, but this is unclear until we know whether they are stolen while 
in use. Mayhew and Harrington (2001) suggest that in only some 14% 
of mobile phone theft was the mobile phone the exclusive target.     
Anecdotal evidence and observation suggests that even the least 
valued portable electronic product is not without value, and is seldom 
or ever discarded. Taken together, a tenable conclusion is that 
perceived value may be the primary driver of mobile phone theft, with 
the other elements of craved taking a secondary role. 
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In the section below on electronic services, the point is made that the 
product/service dichotomy is increasingly unhelpful. To illustrate the 
point, Table 47 illustrates the kind of fraudulent activities which 
mobile telephony enables. The point is that a crime type which has 
been traditionally thought of as tangible (mobile phone theft) can be 
thought of in terms of its facilitation of service-related crime. Mobile 
phones throughout much of Europe are shifting towards 3G 
technology. Downloadable viruses and Trojan horses (executable files), 
malicious code that calls premium numbers or delivers unwanted 
content, theft and fraudulent subsidy of handsets, denial of service 
attacks (jamming and flooding), and piracy of ringtones, images, 
music, games, and videos, might be expected to increase (Lloyd 2003). 
 
Table 47: Types of Mobile Phone Fraud 
Subscription fraud and identity theft  
International roaming fraud 
Agent and reseller fraud 
Network and equipment hacking 
Internet exchange of fraud information 
Insider fraud and collusion 
Call selling operations 
Premium rate service fraud 
Social engineering 
Source: Based on Lloyd (2003) 
4.6. WHAT MIGHT THE FINAL CRIME ASSESSMENT MECHANISM LOOK 
LIKE? 
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The CRAVED framework remains tenable as a framework for measuring 
product vulnerability. What is required is some measure of 
vulnerability provisionally based on CRAVED, i.e. with CRAVED prompts 
preceding a general assessment of vulnerability not constrained by 
answers to the CRAVED prompts. A group should be convened with 
representatives of manufacturers and consumer organisations. If 
CRAVED proves contentious, a threshold of value/weight for electronic 
products and services should be established above which the process 
below is followed. Assessed security should be referred on to a 
EUROPOL hosted technical group which can deem security features as 
good, adequate or insufficient with rated vulnerability, yielding a three 
level rating. NB because services are weightless, all agreements for 
electronic services should be rated alongside products.  
 
Alongside the assessment mechanism outlined above, there should be 
concentrated study of theft characteristics as described in Section 4.4 
above, and a process whereby emerging crime problems in countries 
with high penetration by a new product be communicated to others to 
anticipate and seek to deflect such trends. The example which springs 
immediate to mind as topical is the in-car satellite navigation system.   
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5. IMPLEMENTING THE FINAL CRIME RISK ASSESSMENT MECHANISM 
 
5.1 PROGRESS SO FAR 
It is hoped that the preceding text has explained the rationale for 
developing a crime risk assessment mechanism to assess the risk of 
theft of electronic products and the methodology for developing this 
tool. Section 4.1 highlighted the issues which remained unclear and 
the need to produce a system which would be accepted by both crime 
prevention practitioners (as a tool for advising about risk) as well as 
manufacturers, who would require a higher level of precision due to 
the modifications they would be required to make. Section 4 has 
discussed the concerns regarding the weaknesses with the two 
checklists as well as issues relating to the need to consider the 
changing nature of a product’s vulnerability.  
 
The remaining issues are dealt with in Section 5. These include: 
1. The presentation and implementation of the mechanism – what will 
it look like and how will it be used?  
2. How to engage manufacturers and pre-empt the understandable 
concerns.  
3. How to change a system which incentivises theft – for 
manufacturers whose stolen product needs to be replaced with a new 
purchase and for consumers whose stolen product is often replaced 
with a new upgrade.  
4. How to balance the need to assess the potential vulnerability of a 
product with the risk of miscalculation.  
 
5.2 PROPOSING A MODEL FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Presentation 
It is proposed that the mechanism presented within this report should 
be used as a tool to inform the labelling of consumer electronic 
products.  
 
It is recommended that two systems should be introduced which will 
help consumers make informed decisions when purchasing electronic 
products and also allow manufacturers to market their products as 
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‘Secure’. The first system would be an accreditation scheme and 
associated logo which would allow products meeting the required 
standards to be marketed as a ‘Secure Product’ (or whatever label is 
chosen). The exact specifications would be refined following further 
consultation, but the authors suggest that to be awarded this label, 
products must have a  security rating which is equal to (or higher than) 
the vulnerability score. If a product has a high vulnerability score it 
must have ‘good’ security features (rated by a EURPOL technical 
group). If the product has an ‘insufficient’ level of security, it can still 
be labelled as a ‘Secure Product’ as long as the vulnerability score is 
equally low.  
 
Similar systems are utilised in the food and building industry which 
enable products to be labelled as ‘Secure’ or ‘Healthy’ if they meet 
certain criteria. The ‘Healthy’ logo was proposed by the UK Food 
Standards Agency in their consultation regarding the labelling of food. 
This system would allow food which met the relevant criteria, in terms 
of salt, sugar and fat content, to be labelled as ‘Healthy’ and therefore 
carry the logo.  
 
Food Standards Agency – Healthy Logo  
 
 
In a similar vein, the UK building industry has an accreditation scheme 
for buildings which allows them to be labelled as Secured by Design 
(and therefore marketed using the appropriate logo) where they meet 
the required standards of security. The Netherlands also have an 
accreditation scheme – Police Label Secured Housing - which allows 
consumers to identify whether buildings meet certain security 
standards.  
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UK ACPO - Secured by Design    
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to the proposed voluntary accreditation scheme and 
associated label, it is recommended that the electronics industry are 
invited/encouraged to introduce a second labelling system which 
would enable consumers to easily and immediately identify the levels 
of vulnerability and security of a product. It is proposed that this 
system should be based upon the ‘signposting system’ (currently 
being suggested by the UK Food Standards Agency) and should include 
two signposts (one for vulnerability and one for security) which would 
be coloured according to the product’s ratings (awarded using the 
vulnerability checklist and the EURPOL three level rating). If a product 
scores highly in terms of vulnerability to theft, the vulnerability traffic 
light would be red (i.e. stop). If the product had a medium score in 
terms of its vulnerability to theft the traffic light would be amber (i.e. 
proceed with caution). If the product had a low vulnerability to theft, 
the traffic light will be green (go ahead). The security traffic light 
would be coloured using the same red, amber and green, but the 
ratings would be awarded by the EUROPOL technical group as opposed 
to a formulaic security checklist (see section 4). Below is an illustration 
of the proposed system.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vulnerability Security This combination of green 
vulnerability and green security 
would be an ideal scenario. The 
product has low vulnerability to 
theft, but also has high levels of 
security making it an unlikely target 
for theft. 
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What are the authors’ reasons for proposing the two systems of 
presentation (as opposed to the traffic lights alone or the accreditation 
scheme alone? Firstly, with the accreditation system alone, where 
products fail to achieve the ‘Secure’ label (illustrated above) or 
manufacturers decide not to apply for it, the product would contain no 
information on risk of theft. With the two systems in place, a product 
which has failed to meet the relevant standards or has not applied for 
the accreditation scheme would still contain the basic information to 
inform consumers about its risk of theft. Where a label is absent, 
consumers may not associate this with a negative message. They may 
never have seen the ‘Secure’ label and would therefore not make a 
choice based upon its absence. However, where the ‘Secure’ label was 
absent because the product had failed to meet the relevant criteria, the 
consumer would still be able to interpret from the traffic light system 
that the product had high levels of vulnerability and low levels of 
security.   
 
The second reason for suggesting the two systems is impact. Although 
further research would be required to test this assertion, it is 
Vulnerability Security This combination of red vulnerability 
and red security would be a worst 
case scenario. The product has high 
vulnerability to theft, but low levels 
of security making it a likely target 
for theft. 
Vulnerability Security
This combination of green 
vulnerability and amber security 
would also be acceptable as the level 
of security is higher than the 
estimated level of risk. However, the 
amber (as opposed to green) security 
would warn consumers that the 
product is not as secure as others.  
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suggested that the traffic light system would allow consumers to 
interpret with greater ease the information being portrayed i.e. the 
product is vulnerable to theft, but it is OK because it has high levels of 
security. With the accreditation scheme label alone, it may not be clear 
to consumers what the label means and why the product has it (or 
does not have it). This assertion is supported by research conducted 
into the Secured by Design label in the UK (Armitage, 2000) which 
found that although the logo would have been present on the 
marketing of properties, only 5% of residents were aware that they 
lived in housing considered to be ‘Secure’. Equally, residents who did 
not live in Secured by Design housing (either because their properties 
had failed to comply with the standards or because the developers had 
decided not to apply for the award) would be unlikely to be aware of 
this deficiency in the security of their property.  
 
Bearing this in mind, why not recommend the use of the traffic light 
system without the accreditation scheme? The authors recommend 
that the two systems each serve a purpose and should therefore be 
implemented together. The ‘Secure’ label allows manufacturers to gain 
a commercial advantage over products without the label. It would be a 
simple, recognisable label which could be used for marketing 
purposes. The traffic light system allows consumers to immediately 
recognise a product’s vulnerability to theft as well as its existing level 
of security even if they have no knowledge of the particular 
accreditation scheme.  
 
A Word of Caution 
The ‘traffic light’ system discussed above, to some extent, replicates 
that proposed by the UK Food Standards Agency for foods to contain 
clear front of pack information on the level of fat, sugar and saturates 
contained in products. It was proposed that the food traffic lights 
system be introduced on a voluntary basis and the announcement by 
five of the UK’s biggest food firms in February 2006 that they are to 
use their own labelling system (which is slightly less transparent) has 
been portrayed as a failure of the original proposal. Surely this should 
be seen as a positive. The pressure placed upon the food industry 
through extensive publicity, consultation and policy changes has 
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resulted in five major food companies taking a voluntary decision to 
display clear labels on the front of their products displaying the 
nutritional content of these foods. That the system is slightly less 
transparent than that proposed by the UK government is a challenge 
for the future. If this were replicated within the electronics industry 
and pressure from the government and consumers resulted in 
manufacturers adopting a similar system (although not the exact 
system we are proposing), this would be a huge leap for designing out 
crime.    
 
Implementation 
Although it is proposed that the final mechanism (presented in section 
four) and associated traffic light and accreditation schemes should be 
introduced on a voluntary basis, the authors recommend that these 
schemes should not be introduced in isolation and would need to be 
supported by publicity, further research, financial incentives and even 
legislation. The first rationale for suggesting multiple incentives lies 
with the findings from the original consultation exercise with 12 key 
stakeholders (see section 1.10). Although the majority of respondents 
felt that the accreditation scheme was worth developing, many 
highlighted the need for the scheme to be implemented in conjunction 
with alternative incentives such as educating the public to demand 
secure products, financial incentives for manufacturers to develop 
secure products and legislation requiring the crime proofing of 
products.  
 
The second rationale for recommending that the accreditation scheme 
should be accompanied by additional incentives is informed by the 
experiences of crime reduction accreditation schemes implemented 
within other sectors. The Secured by Design voluntary accreditation 
scheme which was developed in 1989 is awarded to developers who 
design and build housing to an agreed set of standards (these include 
physical security, access, surveillance, territoriality and management 
and maintenance). Although Secured by Design has become 
increasingly popular over the last decade, this has not been achieved 
in isolation and a number of incentives are offered alongside the 
scheme. These incentives have been aimed at developers, consumers 
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and policy makers (locally, regionally and nationally) and take the form 
of legislation, publicity and enhanced funding. The flow chart below 
highlights the many different incentives which have enabled the 
Secured by Design scheme to succeed. It is recommended that a 
similar environment is replicated for electronic products. The details of 
each incentive are outlined below. 
 
Housing Providers: 
The UK Housing Corporation is the Government body which a large 
proportion of social housing (managed by Registered Social 
Landlords). Through its Enhanced Quality Assessments and 
Supplementary Multiplier for Sustainable Housing, the Housing 
Corporation (and therefore the national Government) is able to offer 
financial incentives for Registered Social Landlords who choose to 
build their new housing to the Secured by Design Standard.  
 
In addition to financial incentives, research has been published 
(Armitage and Everson, 2003) which informs developers of the 
importance consumers (house buyers) give to security and their 
willingness to pay for additional security. This research has allowed 
policy makers to challenge developers who suggest that housing 
described or marketed as ‘secure’ would give consumers the 
impression that the areas had a high crime rate.  
 
Developers also have the potential to use Voluntary European building 
standards (The European Standard for the Reduction of Crime and Fear 
of Crime by Urban Planning and Building Design: ENV 1483 parts 1,2 
and 3) to differentiate their product (housing) from others. In addition 
to these building standards, developers who build their properties to 
the Secured by Design standard are able to market their product as 
being less likely to experience crime.  
 
In addition to the Secured by Design scheme which allows developers 
to differentiate their product according to the security it has, 
developers are encouraged to build secure properties through the 
availability of enhanced funding, research findings to suggest that 
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consumers want and will pay for additional security as well and 
European building standards.  
 
Consumers: 
Due to the funding and publication of research into the effectiveness 
of the Secured by Design scheme (Armitage, 2000), consumers are 
able to make an informed choice about the importance of this award.  
 
Consumers are also able to differentiate between products (houses) 
based upon whether they are built to the standard required by the 
Secured by Design scheme as well as the relevant European Building 
standards. 
 
Policy Makers: 
Local authorities, who make decisions regarding the development of 
housing within their area are bound by both national legislation (in the 
form of Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998) as well as 
local, regional and national policy guidance (i.e. Safer Places) which 
requires them to consider the crime and disorder implications of their 
development decisions. These legislative requirements increase the 
pressure placed upon local decision makers to ensure that new 
housing is built to Secured by Design standards.  
   
Figure One: Example of Incentives to Design out Crime in Residential 
Housing 
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5.3 ENGAGING MANUFACTURERS 
The prediction of crime risk, although interesting, will remain without 
impact unless those designing and manufacturing products have some 
incentive to consider the crime and disorder implications of their 
actions. As the results displayed in section three of this report showed, 
of the four sectors consulted, manufacturers of electronic products 
were the most difficult to engage and only represented 9% of the 
sample.  
 
As the previous section highlights, although it is recommended that 
the crime risk assessment mechanism should be utilised on a 
voluntary basis, it is essential that its introduction is accompanied by 
publicity, research, policy and legislative change. For manufacturers to 
accept the benefits of considering the crime implications of their 
design, they must be convinced: a) That consumers want secure 
products and are willing to pay an additional premium for security;  b) 
That national, regional and local governments are taking crime 
seriously and will introduce policy and legislation that creates an 
environment in which criminogenic design will not be tolerated; c) That 
they (manufacturers) will receive a financial incentive to design secure 
products, and d) that they (manufacturers) will be able to gain 
commercial advantage by differentiating their product based upon its 
levels of security. For this scheme to achieve maximum impact, it is 
essential that its introduction is accompanied by measures to address 
these issues. Examples taken from the field of designing out crime 
within the built environment were highlighted in section 5.2, these 
include: 1) The commissioning of research to establish whether 
consumers want secure products and whether they are willing to pay 
an additional premium for these goods; 2) Legislation to extend the 
powers of Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act to the private 
sector (and to whole of Europe); 3) Financial incentives for 
manufacturers who design secure products (these can be justified 
through costs saved i.e. criminal justice system, insurance claims etc.); 
4) Commissioning research to establish whether manufacturers would 
gain a commercial advantage through producing secure products.  
 
To avoid losing the momentum built throughout Project Marc, it is 
recommended that a Working Group is established to facilitate further 
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consultation on the implementation of the proposed system and to 
take forward the recommended proposals. It is essential that 
manufacturers, consumers and policy makers are represented on the 
group and that, where possible, those who took part in the research 
are invited to continue their involvement.  
 
5.4 BALANCING PRE-EMPTIVE ASSESSMENTS WITH THE RISK OF 
MISCALCULATION 
One of the key messages to come from the initial consultation process 
was that the final mechanism must be able to be applied at the 
prototype stage as any security changes required post-production 
would be prohibitively expensive. The ideal scenario, like that found in 
designing out crime in the built environment, would be for 
assessments of vulnerability and security to be made before a product 
is developed to enable changes to be made to the design without 
requiring it to be rebuilt. Although this scenario is (eventually) working 
well within the built environment, with most Architectural Liaison 
Officers/Crime Prevention Design Advisors consulted at the concept 
stage, in an industry which moves as quickly as consumer electronics, 
there is a risk that vulnerability will be miscalculated. One example 
where vulnerability was miscalculated was set-top boxes which enable 
viewers to receive digital stations. As Ekblom (2005) highlights, these 
were ideal candidates for theft in that they weighed very little, were 
very small in size and were likely to cost in excess of £100. As is often 
the case with electronics products, the level of risk of this product was 
altered almost instantly by the industry’s decision to give the boxes 
away whilst recouping costs on service subscription payments. Ekblom 
(2005) questions whether “the forecast can be estimated and 
particularised to a type of product, in its anticipated environment of 
use, with sufficient confidence for design decision-makers to say ‘we 
accept this product is at exceptional risk of theft (and it is in our 
interest to reduce that risk)” (Ekblom, 2005 p.25). Whilst the authors 
accept this reservation, they do not accept that the risk of 
miscalculation outweighs the risk of inaction. The dangers of 
miscalculation in assessing vulnerability involve a) overestimating 
vulnerability (and risking disapproval from manufacturers), or b) 
underestimating vulnerability which would risk the safety of 
consumers. 
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Overestimating Vulnerability 
The potential negative consequences of overestimating the 
vulnerability of a product are 1) the disapproval of manufacturers due 
to consumers avoiding a product which has been mistakenly labelled 
as vulnerable, and 2) consumers taking additional security precautions 
to counteract a product’s vulnerability.  
 
In response to the first point, how likely is it that a miscalculation 
would result in a challenge from manufacturers? The authors propose 
that there are two reasons why this would be unlikely. Firstly, a 
miscalculation is more likely to involve a product i.e. set-top box 
rather than a make/model of a product. In this instance all 
manufacturers of that product would have been affected by the 
negative assessment rather than an individual company. The second 
reason that a challenge would be unlikely is that, like the case of set-
top boxes, the miscalculation would not be immediately apparent and 
may take months/years to come to light. Manufacturers, who would be 
focusing upon the next product, are unlikely to spend time and energy 
challenging an assessment which took place several years before. The 
second point, that consumers take additional precautions in response 
to an inaccurate warning would surely be a risk worth taking.  
 
Underestimating Vulnerability 
The risk of underestimating vulnerability would be a more serious 
concern. The risk of making a false assessment is possible and is likely 
to be increased where assessments are made too early i.e. a product 
appears less vulnerable but changes in advertising/endorsements 
could alter its popularity. To avoid this, the system developed must 
ensure that assessments take place early enough to avoid expensive 
changes to the design of the product, but late enough to be able to 
capture all relevant information relating to the product. The 
assessment system must also be flexible enough to move with 
changes in the market.    
 
These risks highlight the need to consult extensively with 
manufacturers, retailers, designers and consumers before the system 
for implementation is finalised. Although the risks would need to be 
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considered carefully and consumers made aware of the speculative 
nature of the assessments, concerns regarding possible risks should 
not override the potential benefits of implementing this system.  
 
5.5 IS THIS AN EXERCISE IN SELF-DELUSION? 
Although interesting in its own right, the development of an 
assessment to measure the risk of theft is worthless unless 
manufacturers implement it and consumers accept it. This section of 
the report concludes with an attempt to pre-empt the main criticisms 
the Marc proposals may receive. These can be summarised as follows:  
1) Consumers do not want their products to be safe as a theft typically 
results in an upgraded replacement; 2) Offenders who steal a bag or 
burgle a home will not try to differentiate between secure and 
unsecure products, they will simply take the bag and keep what is 
usable and throw away what is not; 3) You cannot ask 
manufacturers/designers to produce undesirable products.    
 
ADDRESSING PERVERSE INCENTIVES 
Although this should not be used as an excuse by the electronics 
industry to avoid the issue of securing their products, there are 
obvious weaknesses in the process of claiming for stolen electronic 
products which act as a disincentive for consumers to demand more 
secure goods. Although this is a valid concern which needs to be 
addressed, the argument that consumers are largely pleased to have 
an electronic product stolen because the insurance company will 
replace it with a newer model ignores three points: 1) That many small 
consumer electronic products are uninsured; 2) That the loss of a 
product such as a laptop, MP3 player or PDA invariable means the loss 
of data and an inconvenience to the consumer; 3) That a theft of a 
product rarely takes place in isolation. The victim whose product is 
stolen may experience physical injury, emotional trauma or even 
death. Recent media reports have highlighted these issues. Both the 
Sunday Times (UK) and the Daily Telegraph reported in late 2005 and 
early 2006 that street robbery was soaring as muggers target iPod 
users (Street Robbery Soars as iPod Users Targeted, 2005; Street 
Robberies Soar as Muggers Target iPod Users, 2006). This problem has 
also been widely reported in the USA with coverage of Steve Jobs 
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(Apple computers) personally contacting the family of a teenager killed 
for his iPod (Jobs Calls Family of Stabbing Victim, 2006).     
 
Opposing the proposed system of securing electronic products on the 
premise that consumers will not want to avoid theft and would prefer 
to become a victim of crime if they receive a new phone is both 
unconvincing and uninformed. The authors suggest that the EU should 
commission further research into this issue to establish to what extent 
these claims are warranted. In addition, further consultation with the 
insurance sector should take place to attempt to increase the 
incentives for manufacturers to produce and consumers to buy secure 
products.  
 
WILL OFFENDERS DIFFERENTIATE? 
A valid point highlighted throughout the consultation process is that 
offenders who steal a bag or burgle a property will not take the time to 
differentiate between secure and unsecure products. They will simply 
take the bag/burgle the property in the hope that the contents will be 
re-usable. One of the most effective methods of avoiding this would 
be to maximise the number of products which achieve the ‘Secure 
Product’ label, thus reducing the odds that the bag taken by an 
offender will contain any usable products. Reducing the likely benefits 
of stealing a bag (or burgling a property) would in turn reduce the 
appeal of such a target.  
 
YOU CANNOT ASK US TO DESIGN UNDESIRABLE PRODUCTS 
The final criticism is a misconception which must be addressed. The 
aim of the proposed system is not to encourage manufacturers and 
designers to develop products which will not be attractive to 
consumers, the aim is to ensure that the products which are highly 
desirable (due to their popularity and value) are equally secure. 
Manufacturers obviously want their products to be attractive to 
consumers, and there is no suggestion that products should be made 
less popular, fashionable or desirable. Rather that the factors which 
make the product attractive to consumers are accompanied by 
commensurate security factors which make them unattractive to 
offenders.  
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6. CRIME PROOFING ELECTRONIC SERVICES 
 
 
This section draws heavily on the innovative work of Graham Farrell 
and Jennifer Mailley of Loughborough University, in particular on their 
work with mobile phone crime. This debt is gratefully acknowledged. 
Funded by the Engineering and Physical Science Research Council in 
the UK, the work is still in progress. Further information about 
publication plans are available from g.farrell@lboro.ac.uk 
 
In 2000, Richard Davis and Ken Pease wrote:  
“More and more electronic entertainment equipment is delivered 
as a service – usually in the form of a signal. Televisions, mobile 
phone and computers are all means of delivering the service – 
and the electronic equipment itself is increasingly becoming 
nothing more than the access point to the service. As such there 
is every likelihood that the hardware will increasingly be sold 
cheaply or given away free as a way of attracting customers to 
the service.  
This will not be limited to current signal-based entertainment. 
Already music downloaded from the Internet and ‘video on 
demand’ are showing there is little which cannot be provided as 
a service rather than in ‘hard’ form. If this happens, then the 
hardware so popular with thieves at present will become 
unattractive, because the real value will reside in the service.” 
(Davis and Pease 2000; 62) 
 
This points up the enormously important point about electronic and 
some other services, namely that they exist in different states at 
different points in the process. There is a plausible simile in electricity 
(and to some degree other utilities) which exists as potential (literally, 
as voltage) until realised for purposes of heating and lighting. With 
convergent technologies, many treasured distinctions will cease to be 
helpful, and that between electronic products and services is probably 
one of them. The conclusion to this section is that ideally strategies of 
measuring and protecting electronic entities should not be segregated 
into services and objects. Whether the CRAVED approach will be 
helpful in the light of this will be discussed. A thought-out and 
detailed application of CRAVED thinking to information theft is 
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presented in Newman and Clarke (2003). This forms a comprehensive 
background to the conception of product and service theft as 
intimately linked. Speaking about information, they write: 
“”[Information] may be at one time be intellectual property, at others a 
list of names and addresses… at others a series of instructions…. 
Thus, the idea of information as a product is far more complex than 
one particular criminogenic consumer product, such as a handgun. … 
Unfortunately the complexity and variety of information… makes it 
especially difficult to suggest specific design changes” (p73) 
  
The difficulty which this creates for the security checklist in the dual 
checklist approach will be discussed both at the end of this section 
and at the end of the report. First, a brief account of what is generally 
understood by crime against electronic services will be offered.  
Criminal misuse of electronic services is taken to include the following:  
 
• Theft of electronic services billed as services e.g. mobile phone 
airtime, cable, satellite and other services.  
 
• Illicit use of electronic services as a facilitator of other crime e.g. 
Phishing leading to identity theft, banking fraud, use of the internet 
to commit copyright theft and other Internet and e-commerce 
related fraud.  
 
• The disruption of electronic service through malice or recklessness. 
 
This restricted scope is necessary in writing this section, but certainly 
partial. In the early days of computer crime, when legislation did not 
reflect digital reality, some hacking offences were prosecuted as 
unlawful abstraction of electricity. In the same way, theft of cable 
service changes the focus from the entertainment acquired to the 
means of acquiring it. It may be that the appropriate focus is (as in the 
above example) the best available ‘pinch point’ for preventive 
intervention, whatever that may be. It is instructive that prosecutions 
in relation to Internet child pornography focuses primarily (but far 
from exclusively) upon the possession of images on the alleged 
perpetrator’s computer. This may be a problem because of cross-
jurisdiction issues, but that simply illustrates that the pinch-point (or 
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points) for intervention should not be separated according to whether 
the crime entity is considered as service or product.      
 
Hacking is frequently involved in the commission of theft of electronic 
services. Moitra and Konda define the terms attack and incident in this 
context, where an attack is  
“a series of intentional steps taken by an attacker to achieve an 
unauthorised result” 
 
and an incident is:  
“a group of related attacks that can be distinguished from other 
attacks because of the distinctiveness of the attackers, attacks, 
objectives, sites and timing.” (Moitra and Konda 2004; 44).  
 
Attacks include root break-ins, account break-ins, denials of service, 
corruption of information, access attempts, and disclosure of 
information, finding distinct patterns of repeat victimisation of the 
same targets. Over one quarter (27%) of the 6684 computer sites 
studied by Moitra and Konda experienced at least three attacks, and 
they suffered an average of twelve attacks. The ten most victimized 
sites experienced an average of 369 attacks. As for volume crime, 
events are concentrated on a small proportion of eligible victims, 
making the prevention task more manageable (Farrell 2005). Repeat 
victimisation has long been known to exist for many types of crime, 
and its possibilities for policing and prevention are now more 
consistently recognised (see Farrell and Pease 1993, Pease 1998, and 
Farrell 2005 for reviews). Some service providers suffer 
disproportionately in terms of the number of attacks and the financial 
value of the resulting theft of services. Such thefts will cluster in time 
and space.  
 
Subscription fraud occurs when a fraudster uses a false or fake identity 
to gain access to an electronic service, for example to obtain a 
subscription to a mobile phone in the U.K. (Bolton and Hand 2002) 
Superimposed fraud occurs where a service is used and charged to the 
account of an unsuspecting payee who has an account. In this scenario 
the person does exist and so they receive the bill for the services used 
by the fraudster. An example of superimposed fraud is where mobile 
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phone cloning occurs, and where sufficient payment authorisation 
details are obtained. International roaming fraud involves subscription 
fraud to obtain mobile phones in one country, and using them 
elsewhere, running up high rate and premium rate roaming call 
charges in the process. The theft of these services is estimated to run 
into billions of Euros.  
 
The use of electronic services directly facilitates intellectual property 
theft. Illegal MP3 and film exchanges are facilitated immensely by the 
internet even thought theft of electronic services itself is not the 
central issue (see above for a discussion of the service/product nexus).  
 
Identity theft occurs where the details of an individual are stolen or 
copied for the purpose of using goods and services in their name. 
Identity theft itself leads to other crimes such as the emptying of bank 
accounts and obtaining credit cards or other credit in the name of the 
victim. E-commerce crime has been tackled most comprehensively to 
date by Newman and Clarke (2003).  
 
Electronic services are frequently misused, as a parallel to criminal 
damage within ‘meat-space’. Bombardment with spam emails is an 
infamous form, as are spam SMS texts to mobile phones, and short-
duration ‘dropped calls’ to mobile phones (where a recipient who 
returns the call to a revenue-share number is charged at a high rate). 
In the UK, the telecommunications regulator Ofcom notes that 
electronic services can be formally ‘misused’ and that this can warrant 
legal action under sections 128-130 of the Communications Act 2003. 
Currently, “A person misuses a network or service if the effect or likely 
effect of their behaviour is to cause unnecessary annoyance, -
inconvenience or anxiety to another person”. (Ofcom 2005; 2). 
However, the growth of the misuse of ‘silent’ telephone calls (resulting 
from telemarketers over-using predictive dialling) means that Ofcom is 
currently considering revising the legal definition of misuse to cover 
these types of calls (Ofcom 2005).  
 
According to AEPOC (European Association for the Protection of 
Encrypted Works and Services), theft or piracy of Pay-TV in Europe 
takes two common forms: 
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• Coded Pay-TV signals for digital transmission are stolen by 
private viewers.  
• Local TV stations and cable networks illegally transmit content 
that does not belong to them.  
In both cases, programming is illegally accessed by forging the smart-
cards and digital decoders necessary to receive the signals. AEPOC 
estimates that every year some 1 billion € is spent in the European 
Union for smart-cards and decoding equipment used to hack into Pay-
TV. Datamonitor forecasts 2.3 million digital pay-TV pirate households 
in Eastern Europe by the end of 2010, with a consequent loss to 
operators of 700 million euros between 2004 and 2010. The European 
Commission (COM 2003) asserts that the knowledge-based economies 
of the 21st century will rely increasingly on pervasive electronic pay 
services and that piracy will have the same detrimental effects in the 
knowledge society as white-collar crime and counterfeiting of goods in 
the 20th century. The report recommends that “legal protection against 
piracy of electronic pay services will make a central contribution to 
achieving the Union’s ambitious target of becoming the most dynamic 
and competitive economy by 2010.” (COM 2003; pg 2) 
 “Piracy occurs in a number of different ways ranging from 
pyramid structures, sometimes linked to organised crime, to 
smaller local phenomena. Thousands are at work across Europe 
and beyond on the technical means for cracking encrypted 
conditional-access signals and reaping a profit on their illicit 
endeavours. 
Commercially, piracy is organised along simple lines. It takes 
very little capital to build a profitable business. Sometimes, 
devices for unauthorised CA decoding are manufactured and 
offered simply to help sales of satellite dish (parabolic antennae) 
rather than for direct profits. The hacker's smart-card is handed 
out in this case as a purchasing incentive. 
Certain retailers and installation companies have been known to 
advise subscribers not to renew their regular subscriptions, 
giving them hacker smart-cards at a reduced price instead.  
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Illegal smart-cards also circumvent decoders that have been 
loaned or rented to subscribers. Conditional-access systems 
come with special software interfaces to make decoders 
inoperable once they have not been returned at the end of the 
rental period. The device can be made operational again only if 
the decoder is used with an authorised smart-card. Illegal cards 
can totally circumvent this process. Often, stolen decoders and 
illegal cards are offered bundled together, adding theft of 
material goods to the violation of conditional access systems.” 
(source: AEPOC (undated)) 
Many components necessary for the reprogramming of the cards, for 
changing parameters of the decoders and the blank cards themselves 
are legally available and have legitimate uses, thus control of their 
distribution is difficult. In the USA, DIRECTV utilises an access card to 
decode a signal. There is a page on E-bay explaining why auctions of 
such cards will not be allowed. 
 
A robust and scaleable conditional access (CA) system can prevent 
piracy (Datamonitor 2005). Farrell (2005) contends that the solution 
may lie in using incentives to bring industry and/ or public action to 
implement security. In early 1991, DirecTV and Spain’s Canal Satellite 
Digital inserted computer code into the hacked smartcards being used 
by some TV pirates. The code added up over time to form an 
executable programme which ended the functionality of the cards. 
Legally used cards had previously been ‘vaccinated’ during normal 
updating, which illegal card users avoided as part of their method of 
avoiding detection. 
 
Smart wallets are essentially mobile phones which incorporate chips 
allowing diverse financial activities and transactions. They typically use 
near-field communication (NFC). NFC is currently used for non-contact 
travel cards in London (the Oyster card) and other cities. NFC is 
expanding rapidly in coverage and, when incorporated into mobile 
phones “could turn your mobile phone into a travel pass, wallet, 
cinema ticket or your door key” (Economist 2005). Historically NFC is 
aligned with Radio Frequency Identifiers (RFIDs) which serve as smart 
electronic tags on consumer products (see Whitehead 2005). NFC-
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mediated development of mobile phones into smart wallets (see 
below), will generate a range of new and enticing criminal 
opportunities. London’s Oyster Card is a non-contact swipe card, 
exchangeable between persons and transport systems which “allows 
you to store up to three Travel cards or Bus Pass season tickets, and 
cash to pay as you go.” (Transport for London 2005). The credit that it 
stores can be swiped in exchange for transportation, but is capable of 
use for other types of transaction. These smart cards can be topped-
up via a variety of means – online, at free-standing machines, or by 
phone. As the average monetary value stored on a card increases, so 
will its attractiveness as a target of theft, robbery or fraud. The 
geography of such crimes will expand with the use of the cards in 
other cities across the EC. The next step is the integration of this NFC 
technology into mobile phones to produce ‘smart wallets’ which can 
be swiped and topped-up in a similar fashion. When personal and 
financial information comes to be integrated with (or accessed by) 
smart wallets, and so the potential for fraud, and large-scale fraud, 
will be very much greater. Once personal information is obtained it can 
be used or sold on. Without adequate security, it seems reasonable to 
expect that software hacks will quickly be developed to attack smart 
wallets, and that this will drive a crime wave of theft and robbery. The 
higher rewards and the sophisticated know-how involved may mean 
that organised crime is quick to move into and expand this market. 
This anticipated crime harvest needs urgent research and preclusive 
action.  
 
Security measures have already been developed to prevent theft of 
electronic services. Statistical models that detect patterns of ostensibly 
fraudulent use, including of electronic services, are becoming 
increasingly sophisticated (Fawcett and Provost 1997). Such software 
typically looks for exceptional patterns, and are most familiar in 
relation to credit card usage where card owners are contacted directly 
if an unusual pattern of use occurs. The detection systems are now 
becoming increasingly sophisticated in response to adaptations by 
offenders (Bolton and Hand 2002).  
 
There are already instances where theft of electronic services could be 
prevented but preventive action is not taken due to a lack of 
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incentives. Theft of mobile phone airtime via SIM-cards has been 
substantially prevented, but theft of handsets continues. Network 
providers quickly realised that they would have to foot the bill for 
stolen phones where the same SIM card was used. The result is a 
smoothly-running system whereby stolen SIM cards are automatically 
disconnected when a phone is reported stolen. Yet mobile phone 
handsets are still frequently stolen despite the fact that the technology 
has long existed whereby they could also be remotely disconnected by 
networks (via their IMEI numbers). This is because, in contrast to SIMS, 
service providers benefit from continued use of handsets if the SIM is 
replaced. Two phones are now on the network if the stolen phone plus 
a replacement are being used. In the first instance (SIMS), networks 
had a financial incentive for crime prevention and rapidly produced a 
flawless smooth-running crime prevention system. In the second, 
networks had no financial incentive (and if anything a financial 
incentive towards inaction), and although the crime prevention effort is 
making some headway (via remote disconnection of IMEIs, the unique 
identified of each handset), it is slow and faltering.8 This is discussed 
here as an illustration of the need for the analysis of incentives for 
crime prevention as these are critical to implementation, and hence to 
crime prevention. At the root of the problem lies recognition of the 
fact that market forces are not sufficient to control theft of electronic 
services, which is why independent research is required.  
 
Newman and Clarke (2003) make the case for the relevance of the 
CRAVED framework to electronic service (information) crime. Products 
or services as transmitted information is eminently concealable, 
removable, valuable and disposable (four of the six elements of 
craved), and (contingently) available and disposable (the remaining two 
elements). Yet, as they stress, the design or other solutions are not as 
straightforward as with many products. To anticipate, this is a point 
that we came to recognise for electronic products, namely that 
CRAVED is an adequate means of assessing vulnerability, but 
measures of security are crude, since they are based upon simple and 
obvious security features which are already recognised. In a serious 
search for crime reduction effect, one would release the ingenuity of 
                                                 
8 The situation is more complex than this due to IMEI re-programming, the development of IMEI databases (local 
EIRs and the international CEIR), but our in-depth study shows the principle holds true (Farrell et al. 2005).  
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designers and engineers to devise novel security solutions, such as 
was evident in the covert building of code to disable pirated TV service 
access cards. This cannot be readily captured in checklist form. There 
are echoes here of long-running debates among security practitioners 
about the value of security standards, namely that they encourage 
building down to just meet a standard, rather than building up to 
achieve effective performance. This theme will be taken up in the 
recommendations section of the report. Finally here, it should be 
stressed that nothing in the foregoing should be taken to suggest 
different principles in estimating vulnerability and protection as 
between electronic products and services. That separation bespeaks a 
worldview inappropriate to the digital age.     
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7. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Recommendation 1: To extend the provisions of Section 17 of the UK 
Crime and Disorder Act to central government as well as the private 
sector and to introduce similar legislation throughout Europe.  
Justification 1: Despite recommendations by the UK government’s own 
Foresight Committee on crime, there remains a failure to extend the 
provisions of Section 17 of the act to central government and the 
private sector. There are three reasons why the provisions should be 
extended: 1) Extending the provisions of Section 17 would allow 
private sector companies, including designers and manufacturers of 
electronic products, to be help legally responsible for the crime 
implications of their actions. 2) Extending the provisions of Section 17 
would avoid the current situation whereby local authorities are 
required to consider the implications of their decisions upon crime and 
disorder, for example requiring all new build housing to meet the 
Secured by Design standard. Yet, a developer who appeals against a 
refusal of planning permission (which was based upon their inability to 
meet the required security levels) can appeal to the government’s 
Planning Inspectorate who are not bound by Sec 17 and therefore 
overturn the appeal. 3) An extension of Sec 17 provisions would 
convey the message that crime reduction is not the sole responsibility 
of the public sector and that the private sector must take responsibility 
for their decisions. In a similar vein to the impact which Health and 
Safety legislation had on working practices, this extension may change 
the way that designers and manufacturers work, not because of the 
real threat of legal action, but because it is accepted that they hold 
some responsibility for the reduction of crime.   
 
Recommendation 2: It is recommended that the mechanism presented 
in this report is used as a tool to inform the labelling of consumer 
electronic products and that two labelling systems are introduced. The 
first an accreditation scheme plus associated logo, the second a 
signposting scheme which allows consumers to immediately identify 
risk of theft without a requirement for further knowledge or 
investigation. It is recommended that the accreditation scheme should 
be introduced on a voluntary basis and that the signposting scheme is 
introduced, initially on a voluntary basis, with a provision that a failure 
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of manufacturers to adopt the system would result in an introduction 
of compulsory labelling.  
Justification 2: The accreditation scheme and associated logo would 
allow manufacturers to market their goods as ‘secure’. The 
signposting system would allow consumers to immediately identify the 
level of risk of theft of that product and to take the necessary action. 
For example, if the product was highly vulnerable but had low levels of 
security, the consumer could a) decide to avoid purchasing this 
product or b) purchase the product but take additional security 
precautions. The accreditation scheme serves a marketing purpose; 
the signpost scheme serves an educational purpose. Introducing the 
accreditation scheme without the signposting scheme would risk 
consumers presented with a product without a ‘secure’ label (because 
the product failed to meet the required standards to achieve the 
Secure award) being unaware of any security deficiency with that 
product.  
 
Recommendation 3: It is recommended that the European Commission 
introduce the two schemes in conjunction with continued publicity 
(relating to the need to design out crime), further research (see 
recommendations 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6), the introduction of financial 
incentives and legislative requirements to consider crime in the design 
of electronic products.  
Justification 3: The example of designing out crime within the built 
environment highlights how success has only been achieved following 
the introduction of a variety of incentives to encourage developers to 
build secure properties. These include: 1) Research highlighting that 
consumers want secure properties and are willing to pay a premium 
for security; 2) Research to show that properties built to the Secured 
by Design standard are less likely to experience crime; 3) Financial 
incentives for developers whose buildings meet the Secured by Design 
standard; 4) Legislative requirements for local authorities to consider 
the crime and disorder implications of their decisions (planning and 
development policy).   
 
Recommendation 4: The European Commission should fund further 
research to identify which makes and models of products are most 
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vulnerable to theft, and circumstances of theft and recovery when 
stolen.  
Justification 4: At present, police recorded crime data would not allow 
researchers to identify the make and model of stolen products. An in-
depth study of actual levels of crime would serve two purposes: 1) To 
validate the findings of this report i.e. do products which score highly 
on the Marc vulnerability checklist actually experience higher levels of 
crime? 2) To confront manufacturers with the reality of the crime risks 
of their products. 3) To clarify the choice between similar security 
requirements across all products of the same type, or to think in 
product-specific terms.  
 
Recommendation 5: The European Commission should ensure that 
(post-implementation) research is undertaken to establish whether 
products which meet the accreditation scheme criteria actually 
experience less theft than those which do not.  
Justification 5: It is essential that any success is publicised and used to 
further sell the scheme. Research into the effectiveness of the scheme 
should also have an improvement orientation, allowing any 
weaknesses with the scheme to be addressed.   
 
Recommendation 6: The European Commission should stimulate 
further research to identify: 1) What priority consumers place on 
security and 2) Whether they are prepared to pay a premium for 
additional security.   
Justification 6: Similar research within the built environment revealed 
that consumers purchasing a new home placed security as their 
number one priority (over and above features such as downstairs WC, 
garage, fitted carpets etc.) and that consumers did not expect 
additional security to be included in the price. This research enables 
developers to be confronted with the evidence that additional security 
would give them a market advantage and that they would be able to 
charge an additional premium for secure homes without the risk of 
putting consumers off.    
 
Recommendation 7: It is recommended that, where possible, 
measurements of risk should take place at the prototype stage. This 
will avoid the need for expensive changes.  
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Justification 7: Although measuring risk too early can risk 
miscalculation, it is essential that the assessment takes place early 
enough to allow changes to the design.  
 
Recommendation 8: It is recommended that discussions take place 
with the insurance sector to establish whether the perverse incentives 
which disincentivise security precautions (due to old products being 
upgraded) can be revised.   
Justification 8: Any risk that consumers will avoid secure products 
should be minimised and perverse incentives removed.  
 
Recommendation 9: The European Commission should encourage 
further research to establish a) what proportion of consumer electronic 
goods are insured; b) the level of inconvenience caused to consumers 
when electronic goods are stolen and c) the proportion of thefts of 
consumer electronic goods which involve violence (and the effect this 
has upon the victim).   
Justification 9: The authors of this report do not agree with the 
suggestion that consumers will not want their products to be secure 
because products which are stolen are replaced with new upgraded 
models. This argument does not address the fact that a large 
proportion of consumer electronic goods are uninsured, that the loss 
of data on a laptop or PDA can cause a huge inconvenience and, most 
importantly, that the theft of a consumer electronic product does not 
take place in isolation and for many victims the experience can be 
extremely frightening. Further research would provide data to 
challenge the assumption that consumers want their goods to be 
stolen.  
  
Recommendation 10: The European Commission should consider 
further research into the decisions made by offenders when selecting 
consumer electronic goods as targets.  
Justification 10: One of the arguments against increasing the security 
of electronic products is that the majority are not targeted, but are 
simply in a stolen handbag, car or house. Further research is required 
to establish what proportion of electronic goods are stolen from 
handbags and what proportion are specifically targeted.   
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Recommendation 11: The European Commission must address the 
misconception that designers and manufacturers are being asked to 
produce undesirable goods.  
Justification 11: One of the misconceptions of the proposals contained 
within this report is that manufacturers are being asked to produce 
undesirable goods. This is not the case and the proposals simply 
suggest that a desirable product must have commensurate levels of 
security. If it is desirable it must be equally secure.  
 
Recommendation 12: That a Working Group be set up to take forward 
the recommendations and proposals contained within this report. 
Justification 12: The work reported here advances understanding of 
security and vulnerability of electronic products and services, which 
could be built upon. It is essential that any Working Group be made up 
of consumers, manufacturers, retailers, policy makers and academics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 114
Appendix 1 – Interview Schedule for Key Stakeholders 
 
 
 
Project Marc - Developing Mechanisms for 
Assessing the Risk of Crime due to legislation and products in order to 
proof them against crime at EU level. 
 
 
 
In an attempt to reduce the levels of theft of electronic products, a consortium of universities 
has been funded by the European Commission to consider the most effective means of 
‘proofing’ electronic products against theft.  
 
Our response has been to develop and expand upon a method proposed by Ron Clarke and 
Graeme Newman in 2002 which assesses products in terms of: 
1. The product’s vulnerability to theft in terms of its attractiveness, value etc,  
2. The product’s security features.  
 
Vulnerability to theft is indexed by the relationship between scores on the two indices. High 
vulnerability/low security items will be particularly prone to theft. Provided that a product 
scores highly enough on the security checklist for its predicted level of risk, it can be designated 
and marketed as Secured Goods by Design (SGD). Clarke and Newman see manufacturers’ 
involvement as voluntary. Those familiar with the crime reduction landscape will recognise the 
parallels with the Secured by Design scheme applying to buildings.    
 
In the current project, key stakeholders like yourself are being asked to comment on whether 
such a crime risk assessment mechanism and associated accreditation scheme are the most 
effective ways of proofing products against theft (and if not what they see as more promising 
approaches), whether the existing checklists are clear, uncontentious and likely to be subscribed 
to by manufacturers and finally, how such as scheme, (or any more promising scheme proposed 
by the stakeholder) should be managed and implemented.  
 
We ask for your name and the organisation which you represent as a means of ensuring that 
participants are credited in any reports/publications. If you wish to remain anonymous, your 
name can be excluded from the questionnaire. If you would like to be credited in the final 
report, but do not want your comments to be attributed to yourself or your company, we will 
ensure that this takes place. There is an opportunity to select the appropriate level of anonymity 
at the end of the questionnaire.  
 
Name…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Organisation…………………………………………………………………………… 
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Question 1: 
Our response to the request to consider the most effective means of proofing electronic 
products against theft has been to design a crime risk assessment mechanism which can be used 
to measure a product’s risk of theft as well as its security features. It is envisaged that this 
mechanism will be used to ascertain whether a product can be awarded Secured Goods by Design 
(SGD) status should a manufacturer decide to apply for this seal of approval.  
 
1a) Based upon your experience, do you think that a crime risk assessment mechanism and 
associated accreditation scheme is worth developing as a means of reducing the theft of 
electronic products?  
 
 
 
 
1b) In your view, what are the benefits of this approach? 
 
 
 
 
1c) In your view, what are the weaknesses associated with this approach?  
 
 
 
 
 
1d) Please outline an alternative strategy which you would favour over the risk-
assessment/accreditation scheme outlined above. If your experience suggests that the proposed 
approach is without value, we would be grateful if you could complete the interview schedule, 
even where it applies specifically to the proposed approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
Question 2: 
From your experience, what, if anything, is currently being done to ensure that security 
considerations are incorporated into the design/manufacture of electronic products?  
 
 
 
 
 
Question 3:  
Are you aware of any existing security standards or award schemes which apply to electronics 
products?  
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Question 4: 
Are you aware of any companies which routinely consider designing out crime in the design and 
manufacture of their products?  
 
 
 
 
 
Question 5:  
As was mentioned in the introduction, we propose to develop a crime risk assessment 
mechanism to measure a product’s vulnerability to crime alongside its security features. To 
qualify for a Secured Goods by Design (SGD) award, products must have levels of security 
commensurate with their vulnerability to theft.  
 
The existing checklists are set out below. Based upon your general and specific comments, we 
will refine these checklists and pilot them on a sample of 60 electronic products before a final 
mechanism is developed.  
 
1. Checklist for Risk of Theft: 
 
 Items Item Score 
CONCEALABLE Check one 
On person (score 2) 
In bag (score 1) 
 
REMOVABLE Check one 
Can be carried in one hand (scores 2) 
Can be carried with two hands (score 1)  
 
AVAILABLE Score 1 for each 
Used outside the home 
Commonly left in parked cars 
Marketed to young males 
Minimal search time for thief to locate product 
 
VALUABLE Score 1 for each 
Costs at least one day’s wages 
Provides access to phone services 
Provides access to the internet 
Provides access to credit 
 
ENJOYABLE Score 1 for each 
Entertaining 
Addictive 
Fashionable 
Luxury item 
Status item 
Aggressive advertising emphasising these themes 
 
DISPOSABLE Score 1 for each 
Widely in demand 
Value easily assessed 
Street price less than 50% of one day’s wages 
 
TOTAL SCORE  
 
5a) Based upon your experience, do you think that this checklist would be applicable to 
electronic products? 
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5b) Do you have any general comments about this checklist as a means of measuring a 
product’s vulnerability to theft?  
 
 
 
 
 
5c) Do you have any specific comments about the checklist i.e. wording, scores, clarity, appeal 
to manufacturers?  
 
 
 
 
 
Question 6:  
Below is the second checklist, which is designed to measure a product’s security features.  
 
2. The Checklist for Product Security: 
 
Security Feature Score 
• Customer education designed into marketing (e.g. security instructions included in 
package) (score 1) 
 
Replacement guarantee to consumer if product stolen. Check one: 
• Within 90 days (score 1) 
• Within 1 year (score 2) 
• Life of product (score 3) 
 
 
• Customer education to minimize risk of theft of product included in retailer training 
(score 1) 
 
• Valid means of unique identification of product (e.g. source tagging) (score 3)  
• Valid means of tracking ownership of product through life cycle (e.g. chipping) 
(score 3) 
 
• Technology designed to delay or defeat attempted theft of item (e.g. packaging) 
(score 3) 
 
• Technology to negate the financial value of the item if stolen (e.g. PIN) (score 3)  
Cost of inclusion of security features has been: 
• 10% or more of production cost (score 2) 
• Up to 10% of the production cost (score 1) 
• Zero cost (score 0) 
 
Cost of security feature included in product has been: 
• Absorbed by manufacturer (score 2) 
• Shared with retailer (score 1) 
• Shared with customer (score 0) 
• Passed on to customer (subtract 1) 
 
Product has been field-tested for theft* 
• Yes (score 1) 
• No (score 0) 
 
TOTAL SCORE   
*Field-testing consist of market research into the product’s perceived attractiveness to thieves.  
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6a) Based upon your experience, do you think that this checklist would be applicable to 
electronic products? 
  
 
 
6b) Do you have any general comments about this checklist as a means of measuring a 
product’s existing levels of security?  
 
 
 
 
6c) Do you have any specific comments about the checklist i.e. wording, scores, clarity, appeal 
to manufacturers?  
 
 
 
 
Question 7:  
Are you aware of any existing incentives to encourage those working within the electronics 
industry to consider the crime implications of their products? 
 
 
 
 
Question 8:  
Which of the following do you think would be most likely to influence the manufacturers of 
electronic products to crime proof their products (please rank these in order, 1 being the most 
likely to influence manufacturers to crime proof their products)?  
 
Consumer demand        
Financial incentives        
Legislation requiring crime proofing of products    
Financial penalties i.e. fines/taxes     
Naming and shaming       
Rewarding good design i.e. Secured Goods by Design scheme     
Legislation making it easier for civil litigation against manufacturer  
Other………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Question 9: 
In terms of implementing the Secured Goods by Design award for electronic products, Clarke and 
Newman proposed the following process for awarding this standard: 
1) Manufacturer decides to apply for Secured Goods by Design; 
2) Undertakes an analysis of inherent risk of theft with checklist one; 
3) Completes assessment of security measures using checklist two, and makes any 
necessary improvements in security; 
4) Submits plans to those responsible for managing the scheme i.e. trade association; 
5) Trade association grants Secured Goods by Design seal of approval (or not); 
6) Trade association reviews the theft history of the product on an annual basis to 
determine any improvements needed in security to retain Secured Goods by Design status.  
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9a) In your view, would manufacturers be interested in applying for Secured Goods by Design 
Status?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
9b) In Secured by Design, which is a similar award given to housing developers who design and 
build their properties to specific standards, the award is owned and managed by the Association 
of Chief Police Officers and the assessments and support is provided by local police 
architectural liaison officers. In your view, who might appropriately have responsibility for 
managing the Secured Goods by Design scheme?  
 
 
 
 
 
Question 10:  
In your view, is there a public demand for secure electronic products?  
 
 
 
 
 
Question 11:  
Finally, what do you think that government’s role should be in ensuring that products are 
designed to be crime resistant?  
 
 
 
 
 
This questionnaire has been sent to key stakeholders within the fields of 
designing out crime and the electronics industry. We would like the views of as 
many important stakeholders as possible and we therefore ask you to suggest two 
more people to take part in this interview whose experience and expertise 
should be tapped. 
 
1……………………………………………. 
2……………………………………………. 
 
 
Finally, please could you select the level of anonymity which you request:  
I would be happy for my answers to be attributed to me by name and organisation  
 
I would be happy for my name and organisation to be credited in the final report, but would 
like my answers to remain anonymous  
 
I am happy for my answers to be included in the final report, but do not want my name or 
organisation to be mentioned  
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Appendix 2 – Stakeholder Questionnaire for Assessing the 
Vulnerability/Security Levels of a Selection of Electronic Products 
  
Project Marc  
Developing Mechanisms for Assessing the Risk of Crime 
due to Legislation and Products in Order to Proof them 
against Crime at an EU Level.  
 
Stakeholder Questionnaire  
 
 
A PROJECT FINANCED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION – DG RESEARCH 
UNDER THE SIXTH FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME 
and coordinated by: 
 
 
in partnership with: 
  
  
  
 
And in co-operation with: 
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In an attempt to reduce the levels of theft of electronic products, a consortium of universities 
has been funded by the European Commission to consider the most effective means of 
‘proofing’ electronic products against theft. We are developing a method proposed by Ron 
Clarke and Graeme Newman in 2002 which assesses the risk of an electronic product being 
stolen with reference to two measurable indices: 
• Vulnerability to theft in terms of their attractiveness, value etc,  
• Existing security features.  
 
A product’s risk of theft is a result of an assessment of these two indices; this means that if an 
electronic product shows high levels of vulnerability and low levels of security features, it will 
be particularly prone to theft. The advantage of this measurement is the ability to predict and 
manage the risk of theft of electronic products and to create a standard that allows certain 
products to be rated as Secured Goods by Design (SGD).  
 
This interview forms part of phase two of the project. Our initial consultation confirmed that, 
in general, participants wanted to retain the notion of a mechanism which consists of two 
checklists measuring both risk and protection respectively, but to re-produce the contents of 
those checklists to address issues of lack of clarity, subjectivity and poor inter-rater reliability.  
 
As part of this process, we are consulting with representatives from the four sectors – law 
enforcement, insurance, consumers and manufacturers from 10 European countries (including 
a mix of original and accession states). We are asking participants to rate a sample of 5 products 
(3 models of each) in terms of their: 
• Vulnerability to theft (high, medium or low), and  
• Existing levels of security (high, medium or low)  
 
We are also asking participants to explain their ratings.   
 
We ask that you complete the following questionnaire electronically and return it to Dr. Rachel 
Armitage (mail@rachelarmitage.co.uk) by the 29th July.  Once responses have been analysed, 
we may conduct a short follow-up telephone interview to clarify any issues. If you have any 
queries whilst completing the questionnaire, please feel free to contact me at the above e-mail 
address.  
 
We ask for your name and the organisation which you represent as a means of ensuring that 
participants are acknowledged for their help in resulting reports and publications. If you would 
like to be acknowledged in the final report, but do not want your comments to be attributed to 
yourself or your company, we will ensure that this takes place. There is an opportunity for you 
to select your desired level of anonymity at the end of the questionnaire. 
 
Name…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Organisation…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 Please read this brief report on MP3 players before completing questions 1- 12. 
 
The table below contains a summary of the main features of three MP3 players. Please read this 
information before answering the questions below.  
 Apple iPod 20Gb Apple iPod Mini iAudio M3 
Price €276.25 (£189.99)  €202.29 (£139) €289.43 (£199) 
Dimensions 
(WxDxH) cm 
6.1 x 1.4 x 10.4 5.1 x 1.3 x 9.1 6.1 x 1.4 x 10.4 
Weight  158g 102g 136g 
Colour  Player and 
headphones are a 
white 
Blue, pink, green or 
silver. Headphones 
are white.  
Silver or brown 
Internal memory 20Gb 4Gb  20Gb 
Fingerprint 
recognition 
× × × 
Link to services  Apple iTunes 
provides a convenient 
legitimate method of 
purchasing music 
electronically to play 
on the iPod. 
However, the iPod 
will play music which 
is downloaded 
illegally.  
Apple iTunes 
provides a convenient 
legitimate method of 
purchasing music 
electronically to play 
on the iPod. 
However, the iPod 
will play music which 
is downloaded 
illegally. 
No copyright 
protection system  
Additional built-in 
security features.  
Free laser engraving if 
purchased directly 
from Apple.  
 
Serial number but no 
reference to 
registering this with 
apple. 
Free laser engraving if 
purchased directly 
from Apple.  
 
Serial number but no 
reference to 
registering this with 
apple. 
× 
 
 
Qu.1: In your opinio
rating of low would su
suggest that the risk of t
 
Low    
Medium  
High    122
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n, how vulnerable is the Apple iPod (MP3 player) to theft? A 
ggest that the product will rarely be stolen; a rating of high would 
heft is high. Please tick one box only. 
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Qu.2: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.3: In your opinion, how secure is the Apple iPod (MP3 player)? A rating of low 
would suggest that the product has low levels of in-built security; a rating of high would suggest 
that the product has substantial levels of in-built security. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.4: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.5: In your opinion, how vulnerable is the Apple iPod Mini (MP3 player) to 
theft? A rating of low would suggest that the product will rarely be stolen; a rating of high 
would suggest that the risk of theft is high. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.6: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
 
Qu.7: In your opinion, how secure is the Apple iPod Mini (MP3 player)? A rating of 
low would suggest that the product has low levels of in-built security; a rating of high would 
suggest that the product has substantial levels of in-built security. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.8: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
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2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.9: In your opinion, how vulnerable is the iAudio M3 (MP3 player) to theft? A 
rating of low would suggest that the product will rarely be stolen; a rating of high would 
suggest that the risk of theft is high. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.10: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.11: In your opinion, how secure is the iAudio M3 (MP3 player)? A rating of low 
would suggest that the product has low levels of in-built security; a rating of high would suggest 
that the product has substantial levels of in-built security. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.12: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
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Please read this brief report on Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) before 
completing questions 13-24. 
The table below contains a summary of the main features of three PDAs. Please read this 
information before answering the questions below.  
 Palm One Zire 72 Palm One Tungsten 
T5 
HP iPAQ rx3715 
Price €189.06 (£129.97) €290.87 (£199.99) €384.16 (£264.13) 
Dimensions 
(WxDxH) cm 
7.5 x 1.7 x 11.6 7.8 x 1.5 x 12.1 7.1 x 1.6 x 11.4 
Weight  136g 146g 158g 
Internal memory 32mb 256mb 64mb 
Digital camera 
function  
? × ? 
MP3 Player ? ? ? 
Telephone × × × 
Bluetooth enabled ? ? ? 
Fingerprint 
recognition 
× × × 
Additional built-in 
security features.  
× × × 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Qu.13: In your opinion, how vulnerable is the Palm One Zire 72 (PDA) to theft? A 
rating of low would suggest that the product will rarely be stolen; a rating of high would 
suggest that the risk of theft is high. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.14: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.15: In your opinion, how secure is the Palm One Zire 72 (PDA)? A rating of low 
would suggest that the product has low levels of in-built security; a rating of high would suggest 
that the product has substantial levels of in-built security. Please tick one box only. 
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Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.16: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.17: In your opinion, how vulnerable is Palm One Tungsten T5 (PDA) to theft? 
A rating of low would suggest that the product will rarely be stolen; a rating of high would 
suggest that the risk of theft is high. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.18: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
 
Qu.19: In your opinion, how secure is the Palm One Tungsten T5 (PDA)? A rating of 
low would suggest that the product has low levels of in-built security; a rating of high would 
suggest that the product has substantial levels of in-built security. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.20: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.21: In your opinion, how vulnerable is HP iPAQ rx3715 (PDA) to theft? A rating 
of low would suggest that the product will rarely be stolen; a rating of high would suggest that 
the risk of theft is high. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
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Qu.22: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
 
Qu.23: In your opinion, how secure is the HP iPAQ rx3715 (PDA)? A rating of low 
would suggest that the product has low levels of in-built security; a rating of high would suggest 
that the product has substantial levels of in-built security. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.24: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
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Please read this brief report on digital cameras before completing questions 25-
36. 
 
The table below contains a summary of the main features of three digital cameras. Please read 
this information before answering the questions below.  
 Olympus Camedia C-
770 Ultra Zoom 
Olympus Camedia C-
5060 
Fuljifilm Finepix 
S7000 
Price €315.49 (£216.95) €450.87 (£309.95) €450.87 (£309.95) 
Dimensions 
(WxDxH) cm 
10.5 x 6.9 x 6.0 12 x 7.5 x 9 12.1 x 9.7 x 8.2 
Weight  280g 534g 500g 
Resolution  4.0 5.0 6.3 
Bluetooth × × × 
Video capture ? ? ? 
Fingerprint 
recognition 
× × × 
Additional built-in 
security features.  
× × × 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Qu.25: In your opinion, how vulnerable is the Olympus Camedia C-770 Ultra 
Zoom (digital camera) to theft? A rating of low would suggest that the product will rarely 
be stolen; a rating of high would suggest that the risk of theft is high. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.26: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.27: In your opinion, how secure is the Olympus Camedia C-770 Ultra Zoom? A 
rating of low would suggest that the product has low levels of in-built security; a rating of high 
would suggest that the product has substantial levels of in-built security. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
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High    
 
Qu.28: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
 
Qu.29: In your opinion, how vulnerable is the Olympus Camedia C-5060 (digital 
camera) to theft? A rating of low would suggest that the product will rarely be stolen; a 
rating of high would suggest that the risk of theft is high. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.30: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.31: In your opinion, how secure is the Olympus Camedia C-5060? A rating of low 
would suggest that the product has low levels of in-built security; a rating of high would suggest 
that the product has substantial levels of in-built security. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.32: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.33: In your opinion, how vulnerable is the Fuljifilm Finepix S7000 (digital 
camera) to theft? A rating of low would suggest that the product will rarely be stolen; a 
rating of high would suggest that the risk of theft is high. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
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Qu.34: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.35: In your opinion, how secure is the FujiFilm Finepix S7000?  A rating of low 
would suggest that the product has low levels of in-built security; a rating of high would suggest 
that the product has substantial levels of in-built security. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.36: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
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Please read this brief report on mobile phones before completing questions 37-48. 
The table below contains a summary of the main features of three models of mobile-
phones. Please read this information before answering the questions below.  
 Motorola V600 Nokia 6230i Sony Ericsson 
K700i 
Price € 257.55 (£176.95) €296.95 (£203.99) € 257.59 (£176.95) 
Height (cm) 8.8 10.3 9 
Weight  116 g 99 g 93 g 
Depth (cm) 2.36  2 2 
Display Type 65 k TFT Colour Active TFT Colour 
Display 
Colour Display 
Form Factor Clamshell × × 
Internal Memory 5 MB 30 MB 41 MB 
GPRS (2u/4d)AMR Class 10 (4+1, 
3+2) 
? 
WAP ? ? ? 
Bluetooth ? ? ? 
Infrared × ? ? 
Integrated Digital 
Camera 
? ? ? 
Performance 
Features 
Quad-band Tri-band Tri-band 
SMS  ? ? ? 
MMS ? ? ? 
Talktime Up to 450 mins Up to 3-5 hours 8 hours 
Stand-by Time Up to 250 hours Up to 150-300 
hours 
300 hours 
Link to services  Motorola V600 provides 
access to web. 
Bluetooth technology 
enables to contact other 
mobiles nearby and 
provides wireless data 
connectivity. 
Nokia 6230i 
provides access to 
web. 
Bluetooth 
technology enables 
to contact other 
mobiles nearby and 
provides wireless 
data connectivity. 
Sony Ericsson k700i 
provides access to 
web. 
Bluetooth technology 
enables to contact 
other mobiles nearby 
and provides wireless 
data connectivity. 
Additional built-in 
security features.  
Call restrictions, phone 
lock, new password 
capability. 
× × 
 
 
 
 
 
 132
Qu.37: In your opinion, how vulnerable is the Motorola V600 to theft? A rating of 
low would suggest that the product will rarely be stolen; a rating of high would suggest that the 
risk of theft is high. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.38: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.39: In your opinion, how secure is the Motorola V600? A rating of low would 
suggest that the product has low levels of in-built security; a rating of high would suggest that 
the product has substantial levels of in-built security. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.40: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
 
Qu.41: In your opinion, how vulnerable is the Nokia 6230i to theft? A rating of low 
would suggest that the product will rarely be stolen; a rating of high would suggest that the risk 
of theft is high. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.42: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.43: In your opinion, how secure is the Nokia 6230i? A rating of low would suggest 
that the product has low levels of in-built security; a rating of high would suggest that the 
product has substantial levels of in-built security. Please tick one box only. 
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Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.44: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.45: In your opinion, how vulnerable is the Sony Ericsson K700i to theft? A 
rating of low would suggest that the product will rarely be stolen; a rating of high would 
suggest that the risk of theft is high. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.46: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.47: In your opinion, how secure is the Sony Ericsson K700i? A rating of low would 
suggest that the product has low levels of in-built security; a rating of high would suggest that 
the product has substantial levels of in-built security. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.48: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
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Please read this brief report on laptops before completing questions 49-60. 
The table below contains a summary of the main features of three models of laptop. 
Please read this information before answering the questions below.  
 Toshiba Satellite 
M30X 159 
Apple PBook G4 15 
inch 
Sony Vaio VGN 
B1XP 
Price € 1162.99 (£799.03) € 2299.67 (£1579.99) € 1413.53 (£971.73) 
Height (cm) 2.95 (front)/3.76 
(rear) 
2.8  2.9 cm 
Weight  3.10 kg 2.5 kg 2.3 kg 
Depth (cm) 27.43 24.1  25.5  
Case Colour × Aluminium Magnesium Alloy 
Screen Size 15.4’’ 15.2 ins 14.1’’ 
CPU Family Intel Centrino PowerPC G4 Intel Centrino 
CPU Speed 1.60 GHz 1670 MHz 1.70 GHz 
Hard Disk Size 60 GB 80 GB 60 GB 
Memory Size 512 MB 512 MB 512 MB 
Integrated modem  ? ? ? 
Integrated Network ? ? ? 
Wireless System ? ? ? 
DVD-ROM/CD-
RW 
? ? ? 
Operating System Microsoft Windows 
XP Home Edition 
Apple MacOS X 
Version 10.3 Panther 
Microsoft Windows 
XP Professional 
Built-in Bluetooth × ? × 
Built-in Network 
Card 
? ? ? 
Software Included ? ? ? 
Link to services  Toshiba Satellite 
M30X 159 provides 
access to web, 
wherever it runs into 
a wireless network. It 
can also be connected 
to web by using 
cables. 
Apple PBook G4 15 
inch provides access to 
web, wherever it runs 
into a wireless 
network. It can also be 
connected to web by 
using cables 
Sony Vaio GN B1XP 
provides access to 
web, wherever it 
runs into a wireless 
network. It can also 
be connected to web 
by using cables 
Additional built-in 
security features.  
Slot for cable-lock; 
HDD memory (by 
screw only); user 
power-on password; 
supervisor password. 
× Norton Internet 
Security; Norton 
Password Manager 
Battery-life Up to 3.5 hours 4.5 hours 4 hours 
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Qu.49: In your opinion, how vulnerable is the Toshiba Satellite M30X 159 to theft? 
A rating of low would suggest that the product will rarely be stolen; a rating of high would 
suggest that the risk of theft is high. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.50: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.51: In your opinion, how secure is the Toshiba Satellite M30X 159? A rating of 
low would suggest that the product has low levels of in-built security; a rating of high would 
suggest that the product has substantial levels of in-built security. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.52: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.53: In your opinion, how vulnerable is the Apple PowerBook 15’’ to theft? A 
rating of low would suggest that the product will rarely be stolen; a rating of high would 
suggest that the risk of theft is high. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.55: In your opinion, how secure is the Apple PowerBook 15’’? A rating of low 
would suggest that the product has low levels of in-built security; a rating of high would suggest 
that the product has substantial levels of in-built security. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
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Medium  
High    
 
Qu.56: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.57: In your opinion, how vulnerable is the Sony Vaio VGN B1XP to theft? A 
rating of low would suggest that the product will rarely be stolen; a rating of high would 
suggest that the risk of theft is high. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.58: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Qu.59: In your opinion, how secure is the Sony Vaio VGN B1XP? A rating of low 
would suggest that the product has low levels of in-built security; a rating of high would suggest 
that the product has substantial levels of in-built security. Please tick one box only. 
 
Low    
Medium  
High    
 
Qu.60: Please provide up to three reasons why you have given this rating.  
1.  
 
2.  
 
3.  
 
Finally, please could you select the level of anonymity which you request. 
 
I would be happy for my answers to be attributed to me by name and organisation  
 
I would be happy for my name and organisation to be credited in the final report, but would 
like my answers to remain anonymous  
 
I am happy for my answers to be included in the final report, but do not want my name or 
organisation to be mentioned  
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